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BUTTERFIELD RIDES AGAIN: PLAINTIFF'S
NEGLIGENCE AS SUPERSEDING OR SOLE
PROXIMATE CAUSE IN SYSTEMS OF PURE
COMPARATIVE RESPONSIBILITY
Paul T. Hayden*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the famous English case of Butterfield v. Forrester, the plain-
tiff left a pub at twilight and rode his horse "as fast as [he] could go
... through the streets of Derby."' As every first-year law student
knows, he didn't make it home on time. Instead, he crashed into a
pole that had been placed across part of the road by the defendant,
who was repairing his house. There was room to ride by the pole,
and the pole could be seen at one hundred yards, but the plaintiff-
while "there was no evidence of his being intoxicated at the time"--
was "riding violently" and failed to avoid it.2  In his suit for
damages, he recovered nothing.
The case is commonly viewed as the genesis of the rule of con-
tributory negligence as a complete bar to recovery against a negligent
defendant; 3 as Lord Ellenborough explained the result, "[o]ne person
* Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. B.A. Yale 1979;
J.D. University of California, Los Angeles 1984. Thanks to Dan B. Dobbs for
helpful comments at several points during the drafting of this Article, and to
my wife Diane Leiserson Hayden for support and editorial suggestions.
Thanks also to my torts students who, over the last few years, have endured
listening to me work out in class some of the theories embodied herein and
have helped sharpen my thinking. Errors in conception and execution are en-
tirely mine. Work on this Article was made possible by a grant from Loyola
Law School, Loyola Marymount University.
1. 103 Eng. Rep. 926, 927 (K.B. 1809).
2. Id. at 927.
3. Writing a century after Butterfield, torts scholar Francis Bohlen found
the doctrine had been used in two earlier cases, Cruden v. Fentham, 2 Esp.
685, 170 Eng. Rep. 496 (1798), and Clay v. Wood, 5 Esp. 44, 170 Eng. Rep.
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being in fault will not dispense with another's using ordinary care for
himself. Two things must concur to support this action, an obstruc-
tion in the road by the fault of the defendant, and no want of ordinary
care to avoid it on the part of the plaintiff.",4 Across the Atlantic, this
reasoning found favor,5 and in most states, for a century and a half or
so, the rule obtained: If a plaintiff were negligent to even the slight-
est degree, and that negligence was a cause of plaintiff's harm, no re-
covery could be had, even against an admittedly negligent defendant
whose act was also a causal factor in plaintiffs harm. These later
courts "may have given greater scope to the Butterfield decision than
its various authors intended,",6 regarding the complete bar rule as
consonant with the era's dominant notions of "[f]ree will, personal
responsibility, and liberty."7 Every person bore the responsibility for
his own safety, and breach of that duty to one's self was fatal to any
attempt to blame one's injury on another.8 It was also said that a
plaintiff was barred on grounds of "unclean hands," or as a kind of
punishment for his own careless conduct.
9
Barring the slightly negligent plaintiff from all recovery is a
harsh and inflexible result,'0 and was recognized as such not too
732 (K.B. 1803). See Francis H. Bohlen, Contributory Negligence, 21 HARv.
L. REv. 233 (1908), reprinted in SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE LAW OF TORTS
469, 469 (Harvard Law Review Association 1924). He noted that in none of
these cases did the judges appear to believe they were announcing a new or
radical rule; rather, in all three cases, "[t]hat a plaintiff who by his own mis-
conduct in conjunction with that of the defendant has brought harm upon him-
self, cannot recover damages, is stated as a well-settled rule." Id.
4. Butterfield, 103 Eng. Rep. at 927.
5. Butterfield was first relied upon as authority in this country to bar a
negligent plaintiff from all recovery in Smith v. Smith, 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 621,
624-25 (1824).
6. VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 1-2(a), at 5 (3d
ed. 1994).
7. HENRY WOODS, COMPARATIVE FAULT § 1:4, at 9 (1978).
8. See Bohlen, supra note 3, at 490.
9. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 65, at 453 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON].
10. This was especially evident in the railroad crossing cases, where the
hapless person struck by a train while crossing the tracks was often barred
from recovery as a matter of law on the ground that he or she obviously failed
to stop, look, and listen, and no reasonable jury could find such conduct non-
negligent See, e.g., Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66
(1927); Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Barlow, 156 S.E. 397 (Va. 1931);
Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Hall's Adm'r, 63 S.E. 1007 (Va. 1909); Tesch
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many decades after its appearance in this country. This led to two
distinct developments. First, courts began to craft ameliorating doc-
trines, rules to be applied to particular fact patterns that would allow
plaintiffs full recovery despite plaintiffs' negligence. Perhaps the
best-known example is the doctrine of "last clear chance,"" which
originated in the 1842 English case of Davies v. Mann,12 involving
an ass negligently left fettered in the middle of the road. Courts ap-
plied this doctrine in hundreds of American railroad-crossing cases
in the early twentieth century to allow helpless plaintiffs (or their
estates) to recover against railroads whose engineers had, but failed
to capitalize upon, the "last clear chance" to avoid a collision.'
3
Other common situations under which a negligent plaintiff could re-
cover full damages included those when the defendant's conduct was
wanton, reckless, or intentional,14 or when the negligent plaintiff was
v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Light Co., 84 N.W. 823 (Wis. 1901); see also Nor-
folk & W. R.R. Co. v. Harman, 8 S.E. 251,257-59 (Va. 1887) (holding that the
negligence of the "semi-intoxicat[ed]" decedent struck and killed by a train
traveling slowly along the tracks was "the sole proximate cause" of his death).
11. While modem sources consistently present the doctrine of last clear
chance as an ameliorating doctrine, see, e.g., DAN B. DOBBS & PAUL T.
HAYDEN, TORTS AND COMPENSATION 244 (3d ed. 1997), it was earlier re-
garded not as an exception to the rule of contributory negligence, but rather as
an application of the same rule that was one of the underpinnings of Butter-
field: that the law denominates as the proximate cause of injury a breach of
one person's duty to avoid the consequences of another's negligence. See, e.g.,
Dutcher v. Wabash Ry. Co., 145 S.W. 63, 80 (Mo. 1912) (Woodson, J., dis-
senting) ("[T]he rule of law is laid down with perfect correctness in the case of
Butterfield v. Forester that, although there may have been negligence on the
part of the plaintiff, yet unless he might, by the exercis[e] of ordinary care,
have avoided the consequences of the defendant's negligence, he is entitled to
recover; if by ordinary care he might have avoided them he is the author of his
own wrong."); see also William Schofield, Davies v. Mann: Theory of Con-
tributory Negligence, 3 HARv. L. REV. 263 (1890), reprinted in SELECTED
ESSAYS ON THE LAW OF TORTS 543, 553 (Harvard Law Review Ass'n 1924)
(giving the same interpretation).
12. 152 Eng. Rep. 588 (Ex. D. 1842).
13. See infra notes 38-46 and accompanying text.
14. See, e.g., Boyette v. Bradley, 100 So. 647, 652 (Ala. 1924) ("It is es-
tablished in this jurisdiction that there can be no plea of contributory negli-
gence to a count charging wantonness, or a willful injury."); Fonda v. St. Paul
City Ry. Co., 74 N.W. 166, 170 (Minn. 1898) ("Where the defendant's acts are
willful and intentional, the negligence of the plaintiff, if any, is no longer
deemed in law a proximate cause of the injury. In such cases the willful and
intentional acts of the defendant are deemed the sole proximate cause.").
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attempting to rescue some third person whom the defendant had left
in a precarious situation.15 In a second and more radical develop-
ment that gathered momentum much later, legislatures and courts
began to reject the very rule itself, adopting allocation schemes under
which juries were instructed to compare the negligence of plaintiffs
and defendants.'
6
15. See, e.g., Eckert v. Long Island R.R., 43 N.Y. 502, 506 (1870) ("The
law has so high a regard for human life that it will not impute negligence to an
effort to preserve it unless made under such circumstances as to constitute
rashness."). For a modem example, see Oulette v. Carde, 612 A.2d 687, 690
(R.I. 1992), holding that a defendant could not use the rescuer's negligence to
reduce his damages in a pure comparative state.
16. Scholars trace the first "comparative negligence" scheme to a series of
medieval European sea codes which gradually evolved the concept. The four-
teenth century compilation of the admiralty court at Oleron, an island off the
west coast of France, provided for divided damages in the event of collisions
between vessels. One provision stated that for certain kinds of accidents, dam-
ages were to be divided in accordance with expert opinion. See WOODS, supra
note 7, § 1:10, at 19 (citing Ernest Turk, Comparative Negligence on the
March, 28 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 189, 223 (1950)). In the United States, the first
true comparative negligence scheme was adopted by Congress in 1908 in the
second Federal Employers Liability Act Pub. L. No. 100, 35 Stat. 65 (codified
as amended at 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1994)), an Act covering railroad employ-
ees' on-the-job injuries. Pure comparative negligence was adopted for per-
sonal injuries to seamen in the 1920 Jones Act Pub. L. No. 261, 41 Stat. 988
(codified as amended at 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1994)), and the 1920 Death on the
High Seas Act Pub. L. No. 165, 41 Stat. 537 (codified as amended at 46
U.S.C. § 766 (1994)).
At the state level, in the 1858 case of Galena & Chicago Union R.R. Co.
v. Jacobs, 20 Ill. 478 (1858), Illinois adopted a system under which a negligent
plaintiff could recover fully "wherever it ... appear[ed] that the plaintiffs
negligence [was] comparatively slight and that of defendant gross." Id. at
497. Three other states (Oregon, Wisconsin, and Tennessee) adopted then
abandoned similar schemes in the late nineteenth century. See SC1tWARTZ, su-
pra note 6, § 1-5(a), at 18-19. Comparative negligence was first adopted for
railroad injuries in Georgia in 1860, and several other states followed suit with
respect to railroad injuries only. See id. The first state to adopt a comprehen-
sive comparative negligence scheme for all personal injury torts was Missis-
sippi, in 1910, followed by Nebraska in 1913, Wisconsin in 1931, South Da-
kota in 1941, and Arkansas in 1955. See id. § 1.4, at 14-16. The explosion of
adoptions occurred in the late 1960s through mid-1970s, during which almost
half the states joined the original six in adopting generally-applicable com-
parative negligence or comparative fault regimes. See id. § 1.4, at 12-17.
Forty-six states now follow some form of comparative scheme.
[Vol. 33:887
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Most scholarly commentators then and now lauded "pure" com-
parative responsibility,' 7 under which the plaintiff may recover from
a negligent defendant regardless of the extent of plaintiffs own neg-
ligence, as the most logical and just approach to the problem--in-
deed, as the final evolutionary stage of the question of allocation of
responsibility in personal injury tort suits.18 Under such a scheme, in
theory at least, a defendant who is but one percent responsible still
pays one percent of the plaintiffs damages, since liability is deter-
mined by degree of responsibility, whatever that degree is found to
be. Despite the popularity of this idea among legal theorists, the
wave of adoptions of pure comparative systems between 1973 and
17. The traditional term "comparative negligence" gradually gave way to
the term "comparative faulf' to reflect the fact that kinds of misconduct other
than negligence are often subject to comparison under the various state
schemes. We appear to be moving toward use of the term "comparative re-
sponsibility," reflecting the fact that many jurisdictions allow comparison of
things beyond fault (such as causation) or of conduct where fault is not an is-
sue (i.e., liability on the basis of strict liability). See, e.g., RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY (Proposed Final Draft,
Mar. 22, 1999) (adopted by American Law Institute on May 18, 1999) [herein-
after RESTATEMENT (THIRD): APPORTIONMENT] (consistently using the term"comparative responsibility"). In keeping with this trend, when this Article
makes reference to comparative systems generally, the term "comparative re-
sponsibility" is most often used, unless it seems more precise to use another.
18. See, e.g., PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 9, § 67, at 471-73 (calling
pure comparison the "simplest" system, lauding its "flexibility and relative
simplicity"); SCHWARTZ, supra note 6, § 22-3, at 448-54 (discussing the search
for the "best comparative fault systens' and concluding that "only pure com-
parative negligence distributes responsibility according to fault of the respec-
tive parties"); STUART M. SPEISER ET. AL., THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS §
11:9, at 413 (1986) ("As demonstrated in the reasoning of the courts that have
adopted the pure form, it is the fairest; most logical and simplest to administer
of all available systems."); William A. Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51
MICH. L. REv. 465, 494 (1953) (denouncing the adoption of modified com-
parison as "pure political compromise"). The American Law Institute adopts
pure comparative responsibility as the proper allocation standard in the new
torts Restatement, which provides that plaintiffs negligence that is a legal
cause of plaintiff's injury "reduces the plaintiff's responsibility in proportion to
the share of responsibility the factfinder assigns to the plaintiff."
RESTATEMENT (THIRD): APPORTIONMENT, supra note 17, § 7. The Uniform
Comparative Fault Act, promulgated by the National Conference on Uniform
State Laws in 1977, also endorses pure comparative fault See UNIF.
COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 1, 12 U.L.A. 127 (1977), reprinted in
SCHWARTZ, supra note 6, § 22-4.
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1984-during which time a dozen states adopted such a system 19--
proved short-lived, and no state has adopted a pure form since 1984.
Further, three states that had adopted a pure form have replaced it
with a modified form in whole20 or part.2 ' As of now, roughly two-
thirds of the states adhere to a modified comparative scheme.22
There are, of course, a number of reasons why pure comparative
responsibility has never swept the nation.23 As one commentator
summarized the critics' views, the pure system is
simply too extreme .... Although the contributory negli-
gence rule created inequity by placing too stringent a line
on plaintiffs fault, pure comparative negligence posits no
line at all. By removing all barriers to the highly culpable
19. The states that adopted pure comparative negligence, with year of first
adoption, are: Mississippi (1910); Arkansas (1955) (repealed in favor of modi-
fied, 1957); Rhode Island (1971); Washington (1973); Florida (1973); New
York (1975); California (1975); Alaska (1975); Louisiana (1979); Michigan
(1979); Illinois (1981) (repealed in favor of modified, 1986); New Mexico
(1981); Missouri (1983); Arizona (1984); Kentucky (1984).
20. Arkansas, which followed pure comparative negligence between 1955
and 1957, and Illinois, which followed pure comparative negligence between
1981 and 1986, both follow a modified form today.
21. Michigan, which followed a pure system between 1979 and 1996, now
follows a modified comparative scheme for non-economic damages and a pure
scheme for economic damages. See MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 600.2959
(West 1996) (providing that if a plaintiff's percentage of fault is greater than
the defendant's, "the court shall reduce economic damages by the percentage
of comparative fault of the [plaintiff] ... and noneconomic damages shall not
be awarded").
22. Under a "modified" form of comparative responsibility, a plaintiffs
claim is barred only if plaintiff's responsibility or fault exceeds a certain level
in comparison to defendant's. All but one of these states uses either a "greater
than" scheme, under which a plaintiff is barred from recovery only if the
plaintiffs responsibility or fault is greater than defendant's, or a "greater than
or equal to" scheme, under which a plaintiff is barred only if the plaintiff's re-
sponsibility or fault is equal to or greater than that of the defendant. That one
state, South Dakota, follows a statutory "slight/gross" scheme, under which a
plaintiffs negligence "shall not bar a recovery when.., slight in comparison
with the negligence of the defendant." S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 20-9-2 (Michie
1995).
23. Despite its minority position in terms of numbers of states, it may well
be that "the pure form of comparative negligence now affects more litigants
than any other system," given its adoption by some of the most populous
states. WOODS, supra note 7, § 4:1, at 77.
[Vol. 33:887
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individual, the pure system erodes both the moral founda-
tion of the fault system and the notion of self-responsibility
which, many believe, still needs nurturing in modem tort
law.
2 4
West Virginia's high court, rejecting a plaintiffs argument that
it should adopt a pure system of comparison, found it "difficult, on
theoretical grounds alone, to rationalize a system which permits a
party who is 95 percent at fault to have his day in court as a plaintiff
because he is 5 percent fault-free. '25 All of these criticisms may be
summed up by saying that truly pure comparison may not be the final
evolutionary stage of allocation in the real world of tort adjudication.
That is, the logical purity of any allocation scheme that would allow
a plaintiff who is 99% responsible (or at fault) to recover a large sum
of money from a defendant who is 1% responsible is marred signifi-
cantly by the intense disdain most people-judges included-would
generally exhibit for such a result.26 One widespread judicial reac-
tion to this reality is the subject of this Article: the retention, in all
but one of the pure comparative states,27 of a rule that allows defen-
dants to assert that the plaintiff s negligence constitutes an interven-
ing superseding cause or sole proximate cause of plaintiffs harm,
thus barring the claim entirely before any comparison can be done.
The continued availability of these defense arguments evidences that
many judges exhibit significant ambivalence towards pure compara-
tive responsibility and insist on retaining some ameliorating
24. Carol A. Mutter, Moving to Comparative Negligence in an Era of Tort
Reform: Decisions for Tennessee, 57 TENN. L. REV. 199, 249 (1990).
25. Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 256 S.E.2d 879, 883 (W. Va. 1979).
26. This is, of course, simply another illustration of the wisdom of Judge
Andrews's oft-quoted comment about proximate cause: "Any philosophical
doctrine of causation does not help us.... This is not logic. It is practical
politics." Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 103 (N.Y. 1928)
(Andrews, J., dissenting).
27. The New Mexico Supreme Court recently held that "the doctrine of in-
dependent intervening cause does not apply to a plaintiff's negligence." Torres
v. El Paso Elec. Co., 987 P.2d 386, 394 (N.M. 1999). While some New Mex-
ico cases prior to Torres utilized the doctrine of "sole proximate cause" to bar
a negligent plaintiff's recovery entirely, see, e.g., Armstrong v. Industrial Elec.
& Equip. Serv., 639 P.2d 81, 85 (N.M. Ct. App. 1981), the language of Torres
would appear to severely undercut, if not eliminate, any such usage in the fu-
ture. New Mexico may thus be characterized as thepurest of the pure states.
"Ipri12000)
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doctrines to soften the sometimes-harsh effects of pure comparison
on defendants in particular cases.
It is certainly true that virtually all states28 have clearly repudi-
ated the holding of Butterfield in its most extreme form, and thus a
plaintiff may no longer be barred from all recovery even if only
slightly negligent, on the simple ground that a negligent plaintiff may
not recover anything against a negligent defendant. However, when
Butterfield is reconstituted with facts intact, facts that led Justice
Bayley to conclude that the rider could not recover because "the ac-
cident appeared to happen entirely from his own fault, '2 9 it has not
been truly repudiated in any state, regardless of what contributory or
comparative scheme it uses. The plaintiff who rides full-blast into a
pole lying halfway across the road when the pole can be seen from a
great distance and where there is plenty of room to go around it will
clearly not recover in one of the few states that adheres to the old
contributory negligence scheme. And in those thirty-four or so states
that follow a modified form of comparative responsibility, this plain-
tiff will probably not recover, either, since most reasonable juries
will likely conclude that the plaintiff was more at fault than the de-
fendant who placed the pole halfway across the road. Finally, in the
pure comparative states, in theory the plaintiff should be able to re-
cover even if the plaintiff is 95% or more at fault. But, as this Arti-
cle points out, defendants in all but one of the pure states may well
escape all liability on these facts by arguing that the plaintiffs con-
duct is so extraordinary, so gross in comparison with defendant's
negligence, as to constitute a superseding or sole proximate cause of
the plaintiffs own harm. That is, while pure comparative responsi-
bility appears to allow an overwhelmingly negligent plaintiff-just
like the plaintiff in Butterfield--to recover a small percentage of
damages, the doctrines of superseding or sole proximate cause often
function to prevent such a result and to entirely bar the claim. Fur-
ther, as this Article argues, the phenomenon of the pure states'
courts' widespread use of these doctrines to bar overwhelmingly
negligent plaintiffs does not undercut systems of pure comparative
28. Contributory negligence continues to function as a complete bar to
plaintiffs' recoveries in Alabama, Maryland, North Carolina, Virginia, and the
District of Columbia.
29. Butterfield, 103 Eng. Rep. at 927.
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responsibility, as most commentators have argued; rather, these doc-
trines serve as useful ameliorating doctrines or safety valves that help
preserve these "pure" systems.
Leading up to a reiteration of this conclusion, this Article first
provides a brief history of the use of superseding or sole proximate
cause as a rationale to bar plaintiffs in the pre-comparative era. Part
III then provides a current jurisdictional survey, describing which
states use the doctrine in this way and which do not. The final Part
of the Article is a functional analysis, focusing on pure comparative
states, discussing the three main functions of the doctrine in this
context: the ameliorative function, the proxy function, and the judge
and jury functions.
II. PLAINTIFF'S NEGLIGENCE AS SUPERSEDING OR SOLE
PROXIMATE CAUSE: A BRIEF HISTORY
When contributory negligence barred a plaintiff's claim entirely,
and a single plaintiff sued a single defendant, there could be at most
one proximate cause of the harm. When the issue was whether the
plaintiff s negligence barred the claim, courts often analyzed the case
in terms of whether the plaintiffs act or the defendant's act was the
legally significant cause of the harm. "The maxim of the law here
applicable," said the Virginia Supreme Court in 1899,
is that in law the immediate, and not the remote, cause of
any event is regarded. In other words, the law always refers
the injury to the proximate, and not to the remote, cause...
. [T]he law will refer the damage to the last or proximate
cause, and refuse to trace it to that which was more re-
mote. 0
Sir Frederick Pollock, perhaps the most respected of the early torts
treatise writers, put it succinctly in the context of a single plaintiff-
single defendant situation:
30. Fowlks v. Southern Ry. Co., 32 S.E. 464, 465 (Va. 1899). The distinc-
tion between "remote" and "proximate" causes traces back to Lord Bacon's
Maxims of the Law: "In law, look to proximate, not remote, causes." MORTON
J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960: THE
CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 52 (1992) (quoting F. BACON, MAXIMS OF THE
LAW, in 7 WORKS 307, 327 (J. Spedding et. al. eds., 1879)).
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Now I may be negligent, and my negligence may be the oc-
casion of some one suffering harm, and yet the immediate
cause of the damage may be not my want of care but his
own. Had I been careful to begin with, he would not have
been in danger; but had he, being so put in danger, used
reasonable care for his own safety or that of his property,
the damage would still not have happened. Thus my origi-
nal negligence is a comparatively remote cause of the harm,
and as things turn out the proximate cause is the sufferer's
own fault, or rather ... he cannot ascribe it to the fault of
another.3'
The idea that a plaintiff's negligent act barred his claim because it,
not the defendant's act, was the proximate cause of the plaintiffs
harm is fairly traceable to Butterfield v. Forrester.32 As Justice
Bayley concluded in holding against the negligent plaintiff, "the ac-
cident appeared to happen entirely from his own fault. ,33 It is not
surprising, then, that many early cases fell naturally into using the
basically interchangeable nomenclature of superseding cause, 34 the
proximate cause, and "sole proximate cause" when finding for either
31. FREDERICK POLLOCK, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS 566-69
(New Am. ed. 1894).
32. 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (K.B. 1809).
33. Id. at 927.
34. Pre-comparative era cases often stated the rule of superseding cause
thusly:
Whenever a new cause [independent intervening circumstance] inter-
venes which is not a consequence of the first wrongful cause, which is
not under the control of the wrongdoer, and which could not have
been foreseen by the exercise of reasonable diligence by the wrong-
doer, and except for which the final injurious consequences would not
have happened, then such injurious consequences must be deemed too
remote to constitute the basis of a cause of action.
Kramer v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R. Co., 276 N.W. 113, 118
(Wis. 1937) (brackets in original) (quoting Morey v. Lake Superior Terminal
& Transfer Ry. Co., 103 N.W. 271, 273 (Wis. 1905)). The Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts defines a superseding cause as "an act of a third person or other
force which by its intervention prevents the actor from being liable for harm to
another which his antecedent negligence is a substantial factor in bringing
about." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 440 (1965) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT (SECOND)]. Intervening force is defined as "one which actively
operates in producing harm to another after the actor's negligent act or omis-
sion has been committed." Id. § 441.
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the plaintiff or the defendant in a negligence case in which both the
plaintiff and the defendant allegedly acted negligently. 5 It was
common in the pre-comparative era to explain contributory negli-
gence in terms of superseding cause, labeling plaintiffs negligence
as a new and independent force intervening between the negligent act
35. The terms "sole proximate cause" and "superseding intervening cause"
are not necessarily synonymous in all contexts. A plaintiff's superseding cause
is always the sole proximate cause, because a court deems it so simply by us-
ing that label. But a sole proximate cause is not always a superseding cause;
sole proximate cause may mean that there is only one act of negligence, or
even one actual cause of the plaintiffs harm, while superseding cause analysis
requires an antecedent negligent act that is also an actual cause of the harm.
See id. §§ 440-41. However, in this Article, the terms are generally used syn-
onymously unless an explicit distinction is drawn, reflecting courts' frequent
use of the terms interchangeably to explain a holding that either the plaintiff or
one defendant is completely legally responsible for the plaintiffs injury. Cf
63 AM. JuR. 2D Products Liability § 28 (1996) (noting that "[s]ome courts
have characterized a superseding cause as being the 'sole cause' of the in-
jury"). They have probably done so in part because two acts of negligence
rarely if ever occur at precisely the same time, making either (or both) terms
properly applicable. In any event, lumping the terms together is quite common
in courts of today and yesterday. For example, in Exxon Co. v. Sofec, Inc., 517
U.S. 830 (1996), the Supreme Court said, "[T]he legal question that we took
this case to address is whether a plaintiff in admiralty that is the superseding
and thus the sole proximate cause of its own injury can recover part of its dam-
ages from tortfeasors" who were also "causes in fact of the plaintiff s injury."
Id. at 840. Recent decisions applying state law also typically use the two terms
interchangeably in this context See, e.g., Grant v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
877 F. Supp. 806, 817 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (stating that under New York law,
"[f]or an intervening act or cause to be deemed superseding (i.e., designated as
the sole cause of an occurrence) it must have been 'unforeseeable'); George v.
State, 674 N.Y.S.2d 742, 743 (1998) (holding that the injured plaintiff s negli-
gent conduct was "the sole and superseding proximate cause of his injuries").
Using sole proximate cause as a synonym for superseding cause has a long
history. As the Virginia Supreme Court put it in a 1910 case in which it barred
recovery for a passenger who negligently alighted from a moving train:
Where an efficient producing cause for injuries is found, it will be
considered the proximate cause, unless another cause or causes, not
incident to but independent of it, are shown to have intervened and
produced the injury. The question must always be, therefore, whether
there was any intermediate cause disconnected from the primary act
and self-operating, which produced the injury.... Where this ques-
tion can be answered in the affirmative, the independent and inter-
vening cause will be regarded as the proximate cause, and the author
of the original act discharged.
Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Wills, 68 S.E. 395, 397 (Va. 1910).
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of defendant and plaintiffs injury,36 or as the sole proximate cause of
the plaintiff's harm,37 or both.35 Similarly, cases often explained last
clear chance rulings in terms of defendant's negligence acting as an
intervening superseding cause39 or the sole proximate cause40 of the
36. See, e.g., Hayes v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 186 S.W.2d 780, 783 (Ark.
1945) (ruling that worker's act in trying to put out a fire without explicit direc-
tions to do so intervened between the railroad's negligence in starting the fire
and his injury); Menden v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 2 N.W.2d 856, 858
(Wis. 1942) (holding decedent's act of picking up live electric wires consti-
tuted an intervening cause, rendering defendant power company's negligence
in failing to maintain the wires in a safe condition a remote cause); see also
PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 9, at 452.
37. See, e.g., Missouri Pac. R.R. Co. v. Merrell, 143 S.W.2d 51, 54 (Ark.
1940) (holding plaintiff, struck by train that had not turned on its headlights, to
be "sole proximate cause" of his own injury); Denver & Rio Grande R.R. Co.
v. Buffehr, 69 P. 582, 585 (Colo. 1902) (holding against a pedestrian struck by
a train, saying, "if plaintiff's own negligence . . . turns out to be the sole
proximate or direct cause of the injury, she is not entitled to recover, whatever
the cause of action be"); Peluso v. De Pasquale, 182 A. 405, 406 (Conn. 1936)
(holding the negligence of the fourteen-year-old plaintiff in riding his scooter
across the street was "the sole proximate cause of the accident," thus barring
recovery).
38. See, e.g., Bean v. Ross Mfg. Co., 344 S.W.2d 18, 28 (Mo. 1961) (char-
acterizing defendant's argument that "the sole proximate cause of plaintiffs
injury" was "his own intervening acts," as "merely a reconsideration of the
question of contributory negligence and, to a lesser degree, the existence of de-
fendant's own negligence").
39. See, e.g., Boyd v. Geary, 12 A.2d 644, 646 (Conn. 1940) (holding that
the point of the last clear chance doctrine is "eliminating antecedent negligence
of the plaintiff as a bar to recovery where it has been superseded by the defen-
dant's subsequent negligence") (quoting Corey v. Phillips, 10 A.2d 370, 372
(Conn. 1939)).
40. See, e.g., Memphis & Charleston R.R. Co. v. Martin, 30 So. 827, 830
(Ala. 1901) (affirming jury verdict for plaintiff struck by train, on the ground
that her negligence "did not proximately contribute to her death, but merely
produced a situation upon which the negligence of the engineer operated as the
sole proximate cause to the infliction of her mortal hurts"); Indianapolis Trac-
tion & Terminal Co. v. Croly, 96 N.E. 973 (Ind. Ct. App. 1911) (holding neg-
ligent plaintiff can recover where "the injury was caused solely by the failure
of the defendant to take advantage of the last clear chance of avoiding the in-
jury," making the defendant's breach of duty "the sole proximate cause" of
plaintiff's harm); Dutcher v. Wabash R.R. Co., 145 S.W. 63, 79-83 (Mo. 1912)
(containing lengthy discussion of last clear chance as defendant's sole proxi-
mate cause); Dent v. Bellows Falls & Saxtons River St. Ry. Co., 116 A. 83, 86
(Vt. 1922) (asserting that negligence of defendant "in not averting the accident
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plaintiffs harm, or an amalgam of the two.4' As an early Connecti-
cut case put it, when a negligent plaintiff, unconscious of the danger,
was struck by a train whose motorman had the last clear chance to
avoid the collision, plaintiff was relieved of the consequences of his
negligence "because the negligence of the motorman in failing to
avoid the accident intervened and became its proximate cause." 42
Plaintiffs negligence "ceased, in a legal sense, to be a proximate
cause of the accident." 43  Many cases so reasoned on "last clear
chance" facts, without ever mentioning "last clear chance." For ex-
ample, in Seward v. Minneapolis Street Railway Co.,44 plaintiff truck
driver parked on an incline and set his hand brake, knowing that it
was "in defective condition., 45 Because the delivery truck was car-
rying flowers that day, he left the motor running to maintain a proper
temperature. After walking some distance from the truck, he noticed
that it was rolling downhill towards a moving streetcar. He ran down
the hill, and in an attempt to reenter the truck, he was seriously in-
jured. The defendant argued contributory negligence and won a jury
verdict. Plaintiffs motion for a new trial was denied, but the Su-
preme Court of Minnesota reversed, finding that the trial court's
instructions on proximate cause were erroneous. Specifically,
the court said that because the streetcar's motorman might have
been able to prevent the collision by using due care, the rule of
after the peril is or should have been discovered, becomes the sole proximate
cause of the injury").
41. See, e.g., Kinderavich v. Palmer, 15 A.2d 83, 89 (Conn. 1940) (con-
cluding negligent plaintiff can recover where defendant "introduces into the
situation a new and independent act of negligence which supersedes that of the
plaintiff and becomes the sole proximate cause of the accident"); Seay v.
Southern Ry., 31 S.E.2d 133, 138 (S.C. 1944) (explaining result in last clear
chance "is accomplished by characterizing the negligence of a defendant, if it
intervenes between the negligence of the plaintiff and the accident, as the sole
proximate cause of the injury, and the plaintiffs antecedent negligence as a
condition or remote cause"); Riedel v. Wheeling Traction Co., 71 S.E. 174,
175 (W. Va. 1911) (stating negligent plaintiff who attempted to cross train
tracks may recover, because "[i]f the defendant was guilty of a subsequent act
of negligence ... such supervening negligence becomes, in law, the proximate
cause of the injury").
42. Nehring v. Connecticut Co., 84 A. 524, 527 (Conn. 1912).
43. Id.
44. 25 N.W.2d 221 (Minn. 1946).
45. Id. at 222.
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"intervening efficient cause" might have resulted in a plaintiffs ver-
dict.46 "That rule, where applicable," said the court, "eliminates the
prior act of negligence as a proximate cause and establishes it in the
status of an 'occasion or condition.',
47
In part, these usages reflect an early preoccupation with finding
a single cause in all cases.45 But they can also be seen as simply a
logical consequence of the widespread acceptance of an all-or-
nothing system where, in a basic two-party situation, only one would
bear the entire loss. To say that the plaintiffs negligent act was a
superseding or sole proximate cause was just another way to say that
the defendant was not legally responsible for the plaintiffs injury.49
To label the defendant's negligent act a superseding or sole proxi-
mate cause was a proxy for the conclusion that the plaintiff had
46. Id. at 223.
47. Id.
48. See, e.g., HORWITZ, supra note 30, at 52-60 (discussing the evolution of
the idea that "above all, it was necessary to find a single scientific cause and
thus a single responsible defendant"); WOODS, supra note 7, § 1:2, at 5 (quot-
ing 8 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 462 (2d ed. 1937) (discussing
a nineteenth and early twentieth century renaissance of the medieval theory
"that liability is based on an act which causes damage" rather than on fault));
Lord Wright of Durley, Contributory Negligence, 13 MOD. L. REv. 2, 5
(1950), cited in PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 9, § 65, at 452 n.14.
49. A good example of this is found in Corrigan v. Portland Traction Co.,
73 P.2d 378 (Or. 1937), where the court ordered dismissal of the case of a
plaintiff who was struck by a truck after alighting from defendant's bus. De-
fendant argued that the plaintiff negligently failed to observe the approaching
truck, "and that such negligence upon the part of the plaintiff was the sole
proximate cause of his injury." Id. at 378. The court found "conclusive" a
case that had held that "the carrier is not liable for an injury resulting from an
intervening cause over which the carrier has no control," but also said that the
defendant was not negligent: "There was no evidence tending to show that the
boy was not let off in a place of safety or that he was not let off at any point
other than the regular place for the discharge of passengers ...." Id. at 379.
Clearly, the court used the doctrines of sole proximate cause and superseding
cause here as synonyms-or explanations-for holding that defendant
breached no duty. See also, e.g., Village of Lockport v. Licht; 77 N.E. 581,
582-83 (Ill. 1906) (on facts similar to Butterfield, denying recovery to plaintiff
on alternative grounds of no negligence by defendant and contributory negli-
gence by plaintiff that was the "sole cause of the accident").
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established a prima facie case against the defendant5° and was not
contributorily negligent.5
In short, in the pre-comparative era, the doctrines of sole proxi-
mate cause and intervening superseding cause functioned as con-
venient shorthand to explain an all-or-nothing result in a two-party
situation. A defendant who missed the last clear chance to save a
helpless negligent plaintiff would be held wholly liable, perhaps be-
cause his negligence was the "sole proximate cause" of the harm,
perhaps because his negligence "intervened" between the plaintiffs
negligence and the injury. A plaintiff who was contributorily negli-
gent would be given no recovery whatsoever, perhaps because his
negligence was the "sole proximate cause" of his injury, perhaps be-
cause his negligence "intervened" between the defendant's negli-
gence and the injury. While these usages added nothing to the law,
substantively, neither were they particularly offensive to it. There
were many consistent doctrinal routes, all leading to the same result.
Gradually, the common law of intervening superseding cause
crystallized into fairly recognizable rules, most of which are still ap-
plied today. An intervening cause, one that comes into operation af-
ter the defendant's negligence has been committed,52 becomes a "su-
perseding cause," cutting off the defendant's liability, when the
intervening act, or the type of harm resulting from that intervening
50. See, e.g., Williams v. Edmunds, 42 N.W. 534, 535 (Mich. 1889) ("[t]he
plaintiff must show that the sole proximate cause of the accident was the negli-
gence of the defendant's servant" in order to recover); Norfolk & Western Ry.
Co. v. Sink's Ex'r, 87 S.E. 740, 743 (Va. 1916) (plaintiff has burden of prov-
ing that defendant's negligence was the "sole proximate cause of the acci-
dent").
51. See, e.g., Burkv. Extrafine Bread Bakery, 208 Cal. 105, 111-12, 280 P.
522, 525 (1929) (holding the trial court's instruction to the jury that it should
render a verdict for plaintiff if it finds that defendant's negligence was the
"sole proximate cause" of plaintiff's injuries adequately informed the jury "on
the law of proximate cause and contributory negligence"); Woodhead v. Wil-
kinson, 181 Cal. 599, 602, 185 P. 851, 853 (1919) (holding that the trial court's
explicit finding that the defendant's negligence was "the sole and proximate
cause" of plaintiffs injuries equates to a finding that the plaintiff was not con-
tributorily negligent); Gerow v. Hawkins, 192 N.E. 713 (Ind. Ct. App. 1934)
(same).
52. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 34, § 441.
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act, is not reasonably foreseeable. 53 The Restatement adds that "[t]he
intervention of a force which is a normal consequence of a situation
created by the actor's negligent conduct is not a superseding cause of
harm,"' 54 and neither is an intervening act superseding "[w]here the
negligent conduct of the actor creates or increases the foreseeable
risk of harm through the intervention of another force." 55 The Re-
statement itself does not explicitly say whether a plaintiffs negli-
gence can constitute a superseding cause or be labeled the sole
proximate cause of the plaintiffs own harm.
56
IMl. A CURRENT JURISDICTIONAL SURVEY
Jurisdictions today disagree over the propriety of labeling a
plaintiffs misconduct a superseding or sole proximate cause of the
plaintiff s injury. Further, within several jurisdictions, the case law
is conflicting, with some courts approving of such an analysis and
others disapproving. And even within those states that have ap-
proved the practice, vigorous dissents are often filed that charge the
majority with fundamental error.
What appears at first glance to be an utterly chaotic situation,
however, may not be. At least, there may be a good explanation for
the split among jurisdictions. While twenty or so states utilize this
doctrinal device against negligent plaintiffs, it is disproportionately
used in those jurisdictions that have a pure form of comparative
53. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 9, § 44; 57A AM. JUR. 2D Prod-
ucts Liability § 652 (1989) ("The general rule... is that the intervening negli-
gence of the plaintiff does not supersede prior negligent conduct by another as
a proximate cause of an injury where the plaintiff s subsequent act was a rea-
sonably foreseeable result of the defendant's negligence."). It is thus accurate
to speak of the doctrine of intervening superseding cause as a "limiting princi-
ple" of the doctrine of proximate cause. See SPEISER ET AL., supra note 18, §
11:9, at 413.
54. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 34, § 443.
55. Id. § 442A.
56. The Restatement (Second) has sixteen sections on intervening and su-
perseding cause. The clearest "road map" through these sections is SPEISER ET
AL., supra note 18, §§ 11:9 to 12, at 413-24, although the authors note that the
doctrine has "engendered hundreds of decisions; they have probably been de-
cided correctly on a strictly factual, case-by-case, ad hoc basis-but their
broad statements are exceedingly difficult to reconcile." Id. § 11:9, at 413
(emphasis added).
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responsibility. Currently, eleven states follow such a pure scheme:
Alaska,5 7 California,58 Florida,59 Kentucky,60 Louisiana 6 1 Missis-
sippi,62 Missouri,63 New Mexico, 4 New York,65 Rhode Island 6 6 and
Washington.67 Michigan follows a hybrid pure form, with economic
damages subject to a pure comparison and non-economic damages to
a "modified" comparison.68 A pure form of comparative responsi-
bility is also used in federal maritime cases (both collision/grounding
cases and Jones Act/personal injury cases) 69 and Federal Employer
Liability Act70 cases.
Simple state counting shows that all but one of the pure states
explicitly approve using superseding or sole proximate cause to bar
plaintiffs' recoveries, 71 while only about a third of the modified
states do. Pure states that have approved of using superseding cause
to bar a negligent plaintiff include Alaska,72 Florida,73 Michigan, 74
57. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.17.060,-.080,-.090 (Michie 1998).
58. See Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal.
Rptr. 858 (1975).
59. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.81 (West 1997).
60. See Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 411.182 (Michie 1992).
61. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2323 (West 1997).
62. See MIss. CODEANN. § 11-7-15 (1972).
63. See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.765 (West 1988) (pure form for products
liability cases); Gustafson v. Benda, 661 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. 1983).
64. See Scott v. Rizzo, 634 P.2d 1234 (N.M. 1981).
65. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 1411-1413 (McKinney 1997).
66. See R-I. GEN. LAWS § 9-20-4 (1997).
67. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.22.005 (West 1988).
68. MIcH. COMP. LAWS §§ 600.2957, -.2958, -.2959 (1996).
69. See United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397 (1975) (colli-
sion); Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1999); Death on the High Seas Act, 46
U.S.C. § 766 (1999) (personal injury).
70. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1999).
71. New Mexico is that state. See Torres v. El Paso Elec. Co., 987 P.2d
386 (N.M. 1999).
72. See, e.g., State v. Kaatz, 572 P.2d 775 (Alaska 1977) (stating that if a
plaintiffs own conduct is a superseding cause of his harm, he cannot recover
even though defendant owes him a duty of due care).
73. See, e.g., Ruiz v. Westbrooke Lake Homes, Inc., 559 So. 2d 1172, 1174
(Fla. Dist. Ct App. 1990) (affrming summary judgment for defendant home-
owners association on the ground that the volitional act of the injured child in
jumping from the monkey bars superseded any negligence of the defendant and
became the sole proximate cause of his harm); see also Worthington v. United
States, 21 F.3d 399, 406 (11th Cir. 1994) (applying Florida law, finding pilot-
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Missouri,75 New York,76 Rhode Island,77 and Washington.78 Puerto
Rico, which follows pure comparative negligence, has also done so.
79
Another group of pure states have barred negligent plaintiffs on
the ground that the plaintiffs conduct was the sole proximate
cause of the injury. This group includes California,
8" Louisiana,8 1
ing error by plaintiff not to be a superseding intervening cause on the ground
that such error was "neither bizarre nor unforeseeable").
74. See, e.g., Warren v. Michigan Gas Util. Co., 283 N.W.2d 703, 706
(Mich. Ct App. 1979) (approving standard "jury instructions on superseding
intervening cause" in case alleging that sole proximate cause of plaintiff's in-
jury was the negligence of the plaintiff and his employer).
75. See, e.g., Williams v. Birkeness, 34 F.3d 695, 697 (8th Cir. 1994)
(stating that under Missouri law, "a plaintiffs intervening conduct may be an
independent cause absolving a negligent defendant from liability"); Eidson v.
Reproductive Health Servs., 863 S.W.2d 621, 626-27 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993)
(same); Vann v. Town Topic, Inc., 780 S.W.2d 659, 661-62 (Mo. Ct. App.
1989) (same).
76. See, e.g., George v. State, 674 N.Y.S.2d 742, 743 (App. Div. 1998)
(plaintiff injured when he jumped eight feet down to help an injured co-worker
held barred from recovery because his "gratuitous and unnecessary second
jump was the sole and superseding proximate cause of his injuries"); Lionarons
v. General Elec. Co., 626 N.Y.S.2d 321 (1995) (swimmer who dove into shal-
low water in river barred from recovery against landowners because his dive
was a superseding event); Falcone v. City of N.Y., 566 N.Y.S.2d 352 (1991)
(decedent's use of a volatile chemical to clean up water damage after the city's
alleged negligence in causing flood was an extraordinary, unforeseeable act
that severed causal connection between his death and the city's negligence);
Griffith v. City of N.Y., 507 N.Y.S.2d 445 (1986) (student's fall from an open
window was an unforeseeable act that broke the causal chain between school's
negligent conduct in denying him medical treatment and his injuries).
77. See, e.g., Kuras v. International Harvester Co., 820 F.2d 15, 18 (1st Cir.
1987) (applying Rhode Island law, affirming directed verdict for defendant on
the ground that plaintiffs act of placing his hand into the spinning blade of a
lawn mower was an intervening act that precluded his recovery).
78. See, e.g., Daly v. Lynch, 600 P.2d 592, 596-97 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979)
(affirming jury verdict against plaintiff on ground that plaintiffs act in im-
properly tucking in the bedspread on which she tripped was "an intervening
cause which superseded the negligence" of the defendant).
79. See, e.g., Malave-Felix v. Volvo Car Corp., 946 F.2d 967, 973 (1st Cir.
1991) (applying Puerto Rico law, affirming a directed verdict for defendant on
the ground that plaintiffs driving error was an "unforeseeable intervening
cause").
80. See, e.g., Elder v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 66 Cal. App. 3d 650, 664,
136 Cal. Rptr. 203, 210 (Ct. App. 1977) (affirming nonsuit for defendant on
ground that plaintiffs conduct was sole proximate cause of workplace injury).
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Kentucky,82 and Mississippi,83 as well as courts in pure states that
also approve the use of the superseding cause doctrine by name to
bar plaintiffs' recovery.84 In the pure federal law systems, super-
seding cause has been expressly approved in maritime cases involv-
ing collisions and groundings85 and personal injuries. 86 In FELA
81. See, e.g., Reese v. Griffith, 568 So. 2d 1146, 1150-51 (La. Ct. App.
1990) (affirming defense verdict where, despite defendant's negligence in
maintaining apartment-building parking lot, plaintiffs own fault in taking
shortcut because of bad weather was sole cause of his harm, "legally and fac-
tually"); Martin v. Davis, 478 So. 2d 949, 952 (La. Ct App. 1985) (affirming
jury's finding that plaintiff's negligent driving was sole proximate cause of ac-
cident).
82. See, e.g., Tennyson v. Brower, 823 F. Supp. 421, 423-24 (E.D. Ky.
1993) (plaintiffs negligence may be "sole proximate cause" pf harm, even
though "superseding cause" has no application to a plaintiff's misconduct after
the adoption of pure comparative fault); Carlotta v. Warner, 601 F. Supp. 749,
753-54 (E.D. Ky. 1985) (same).
83. See, e.g., Donald v. Triple S Well Serv., Inc., 708 So. 2d 1318, 1326
(Miss. 1998) (holding correct a standard jury instruction that provides if plain-
tiff's action was the sole proximate cause of his harm, he can recover nothing);
Braswell v. Economy Supply Co., 281 So. 2d 669, 677 (Miss. 1973) (partial
abolition of assumption of risk does not prevent a defendant from arguing that
the plaintiffs negligence was the sole proximate cause of his injury).
84. See, e.g., Hervey v. Alfonso, 650 So. 2d 644, 646 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1995) (noting in dictum that a defendant who proves that a plaintiffs negli-
gence was the sole proximate cause of his injury is entitled to summary judg-
ment) (citing Bradford v. Bernstein, 510 So. 2d 1204, 1206 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1987)); Armstrong v. Industrial Elec. & Equip. Serv., 639 P.2d 81, 85 (N.M.
Ct App. 1981) (stating that plaintiff in comparative negligence action is barred
from recovery if his negligence is the "sole legal cause" of his damage); Weller
v. Colleges of the Senecas, 635 N.Y.S.2d 990, 993-94 (1995) (plaintiffs con-
duct in riding bicycle on path between trees after dark may constitute sole
proximate cause of harm, even if it was not primary assumption of risk);
Brashear v. Puget Sound Power & Light Co., 667 P.2d 78, 80-81 (Wash. 1983)
(reinstating jury finding, based on "sole proximate cause" instruction, that
plaintiff's own conduct when he fell from a power pole, rather than any con-
duct of defendant, solely caused his harm).
85. See Exxon Co., U.S.A. v. Sofec, Inc., 517 U.S. 830, 836 (1996).
86. See, e.g., Wilson v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 150 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir.
1998) (contributory negligence a complete defense in Jones Act case where
jury finds the plaintiff's own negligence was the sole proximate cause of his
injury); Gavagan v. United States, 955 F.2d 1016, 1022 (5th Cir. 1992) (plain-
tiff barred where his own actions "were the sole and proximate cause of his
own injuries").
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cases, courts have split on the propriety of using either superseding
cause or sole proximate cause against negligent plaintiffs.17
Perhaps the best-known recent jurisdictional split was ultimately
resolved, at least for now, in federal maritime law by the 1996 Exxon
v. Sofec88 case from the United States Supreme Court. In that case,
Justice Thomas, writing for a unanimous Court, announced that "we
affirm that the requirement of legal or 'proximate' causation, and the
related 'superseding cause' doctrine, apply in admiralty notwith-
standing our adoption of the comparative fault principle." 89 In that
case, the tanker Exxon Houston, having broken away from a mooring
manufactured by defendant Sofec, ran aground on a Hawaiian reef
after the Houston's captain made a series of maneuvers that the dis-
trict court characterized as "extraordinary negligence." 90 Exxon-
the tanker's owners--sued Sofec and the owner-operator of the moor-
ing system, Hawaiian Independent Refinery, Inc., for the loss of the
ship and its cargo on theories of negligence and breach of warranty.91
Following a three-week bench trial, the district court "found that
Captain Coyne's (and by imputation, Exxon's) extraordinary negli-
gence was the superseding and sole proximate cause of the Hous-
ton 's grounding., 92 Both the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court
affirmed.
Exxon v. Sofec resolved a circuit split that had existed for just
over a decade. While several lower federal courts had held that a
plaintiffs negligence could be a superseding or sole proximate
cause,93 the Eleventh Circuit plainly had held to the contrary. 94 In
87. Compare, e.g., Strobel v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. Ry. Co., 96
N.W.2d 195, 201 (Minn. 1959) (plaintiffs negligence can be regarded as in-
tervening superseding cause in FELA case), with Page v. St. Louis S.W. Ry.
Co., 349 F.2d 820, 826-27 (5th Cir. 1965) (sole proximate cause not properly
applied in FELA's pure comparative fault regime).
88. 517 U.S. 830 (1996).
89. Id. at 832.
90. Id. at 840.
91. See id. at 834.
92. Id. at 835.
93. See, e.g., Lone Star Indus., Inc. v. Mays Towing Co., 927 F.2d 1453,
1458 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding that barge owner's negligence in failing to in-
spect boat before unloading, and having only one worker present during un-
loading was superseding cause of the barge's sinking); Afran Transport Co. v.
S/T Maria Venizelos, 450 F. Supp. 621, 638-39 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (finding the
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Hercules, Inc. v. Stevens Shipping Co.95 the court explicitly held that
the doctrine of intervening negligence had no place in the pure com-
parative scheme of admiralty law. Judge Kravitch, writing for a
unanimous panel, said that "[u]nder a 'proportional fault' system, no
justification exists for applying the doctrines of intervening negli-
gence and last clear chance.... [C]omplete apportionment between
the negligent parties, based on their respective degrees of fault, is the
proper method for calculating and awarding damages in maritime
cases." 96 Labeling a plaintiff s negligence an intervening cause was,
in the court's view, an improper attempt to "circumvent this 'propor-
tional fault' concept. 97
The Hercules court's criticism is not at all unique; a number of
states have decided that intervening superseding cause should not be
used to bar a plaintiffs recovery after the adoption of comparative
negligence. A number of these courts have so opined after Exxon v.
Sofec. To take a recent example, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
held in 1998 that superseding cause was not applicable to a single
plaintiff-single defendant case.98 In this case, plaintiffs husband
was killed in a one-car accident when the family car he was driving
crossed over the oncoming lane, slammed into a guardrail, and struck
a concrete bridge abutment.99 Plaintiff, who was a passenger in the
car, sued the state transportation department, alleging defective con-
ditions of the roadway and guardrails and improper guardrail main-
tenance.' 00 The jury found the defendant 60% negligent and dece-
dent 40% negligent, and awarded plaintiff damages of $1.7
million.' 0' The trial court then granted defendant's motion for a new
trial on the ground that a jury instruction should have been given on
plaintiff vessel's ungrounding efforts "were so negligent as to be a supervening
cause" freeing defendants from all liability for the damages attributable to un-
grounding).
94. See Hercules, Inc. v. Stevens Shipping Co., 765 F.2d 1069, 1075 (11th
Cir. 1985).
95. 765 F.2d 1069 (11th Cir. 1985).
96. Id. at 1075.
97. Id.
98. See Von der Heide v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Transp., 718 A.2d 286,
289-90 (Pa. 1998).
99. See id. at 287.
100. See id.at288.
101. See id.
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decedent's superseding cause. 10 2 The appeals court reversed the new
trial order and reinstated the jury verdict, 0 3 and the supreme court
affirmed.' 0 4 Quoting the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the court
said, "[a] superseding cause is an act of a third person or other force
which, by its intervention, prevents the actor from being liable for
harm to another which his antecedent negligence is a substantial
factor in bringing about."' 5 Even if decedent's action was unfore-
seeable, which is required to turn an "intervening" cause into a "su-
perseding" one, "the mere reasonable unforeseeability of [his] con-
duct does not render it a superseding cause without having first been
the act of a third person."' 0 6 Because the concept of intervening su-
perseding cause properly applies only to the acts of "someone or
something other than the plaintiff or the defendant," the trial court
had in essence "confuse[d] the concepts of superseding cause and
comparative negligence."'107 In a modified comparative state such as
Pennsylvania, the court reasoned, the plaintiffs negligent act may
bar recovery, but only if the jury determines that the injuries were
due more to the plaintiffs negligence than to the defendant's. But
"this identity of outcomes in no way makes comparative negligence,
whatever the degree, the equivalent of superseding cause."'108
A federal district court made the same point in a 1996 case ap-
plying Delaware law.'09 In that case, defendant sold and installed a
waste treatment drying machine on which plaintiff was working
when his pants leg became caught in an exposed drive chain and
sprocket assembly. In trying to extricate his pants from the machine,
plaintiff's hand became caught in it and he suffered the loss of three
fingers and a broken arm."0 Plaintiff sued on theories of negligence,
strict liability, and breach of warranty, and defendant moved for
summary judgment arguing, inter alia, that plaintiff's own negligence
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. See id. at 290.
105. Id. at 288 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 34, § 440).
106. Id. (citing Trude v. Martin, 660 A.2d 626, 632 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995)).
107. Id.
108. Id. at289.
109. See Hansen v. Umtech Industrieservice Und Spedition, GmbH, Civ. A.
No. 95-516 MMS, 1996 WL 622557 (D. Del. July 3, 1996).
110. Seeid. at*l.
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"is a superseding cause of his injuries.""' Denying the motion, the
court said that "[s]uperseding causes refer to new and independent
acts, not to the plaintiff s own negligence."'" 2 The court, noting that
defendant was in essence arguing that plaintiff was the sole cause of
his injury, found such an argument at odds with Delaware's modified
comparative fault scheme:
Stripped to its most basic element, [defendant] is asking this
court to decide that the combination of [plaintiff s] acts and
omissions amounts to more than 50% of the negligence
which led to his injury. This determination cannot be made
as a matter of law, and therefore must be made by a jury." 3
Illinois similarly limits the application of sole proximate cause.
As its high court said in 1997, a jury instruction on sole proximate
cause is proper "only where there is evidence tending to show that
the sole proximate cause of the occurrence was the conduct of a third
person."'" 4 The court, holding that the trial court did not err in re-
fusing a sole proximate cause instruction in a medical malpractice
case in which the jury awarded the plaintiff $8 million, said:
A defendant is not automatically entitled to a sole proxi-
mate cause instruction wherever there is evidence that...
more than one person may have been negligent. Instead, a
sole proximate cause instruction is not appropriate unless
there is evidence that the sole proximate cause (not "a"
proximate cause) of a plaintiffs injury is conduct of an-
other person or condition." 5
The Nebraska Supreme Court has simply concluded that juries
should no longer be instructed on "efficient intervening causes" in
negligence cases." 6 In Sacco v. Carothers, a bar patron who was
injured in a fight with a fellow patron after the bartender told them to
"take it outside" or she would call the police, sued the bar owner for
his injuries. The supreme court reversed a defense verdict on the
111. Id. at*8.
112. Id. at *10 n.4 (citing Duphily v. Delaware Elec. Coop., Inc., 662 A.2d
821, 829 (Del. 1995)).
113. Id. at*10.
114. Holton v. Memorial Hosp., 679 N.E.2d 1202, 1219 (Ill. 1997).
115. Id.
116. See Sacco v. Carothers, 567 N.W.2d 299,305 (Neb. 1997).
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ground that a jury instruction on intervening superseding cause was
prejudicial error." 7 Nebraska courts had earlier held, in accordance
with the plain language of the Restatement, that superseding or inter-
vening cause does not apply to the acts of the plaintiff or a defen-
dant; as the court said, the rule in Nebraska is:
An efficient intervening cause is a new, independent
force intervening between the defendant's negligent act and
the plaintiffs injury by the negligence of a third person
who had full control of the situation, whose negligence the
defendant could not anticipate or contemplate, and whose
negligence resulted directly in the plaintiff's injury."'
The defendant in Sacco thus argued that it was the intervening
act of the other bar patron, not the plaintiff, that superseded the bar-
tender's negligence. The court held as a matter of law that the other
patron's "physical activity... in engaging in a fight with Sacco was
not an efficient intervening cause."" 9 The court went on, since it
was remanding for a new trial, to determine that "the practice of in-
structing juries regarding 'efficient intervening' cause should hence-
forth be discontinued by the trial courts of this state."' 20 A proper in-
struction of proximate causation, the court reasoned, is sufficient to
encompass notions of intervening cause without the "confusion that
persists when the concept of efficient intervening cause, often re-
ferred to as superseding cause, is treated as separate from that of
proximate cause.''2 In other words, the idea or concept of a new
and independent cause freeing the defendant from liability is ade-
quately reflected in a general proximate cause instruction, making a
separate instruction on superseding cause simply a confusing dis-
traction "from a more direct assessment of whether the defendant's
actions have proximately caused the plaintiffs injury."'
122
117. See id.
118. Id. at 304 (citing Anderson/Couvillon v. Nebraska Dept. of Soc. Servs.,
538 N.W.2d 732 (Neb. 1995), and Merrick v. Thomas, 522 N.W.2d 402 (Neb.
1994)).
119. Id. at305.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at306.
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New Mexico's Supreme Court came to the same conclusion, on
basically the same grounds, in Torres v. El Paso Electric Co.,' 23 de-
cided in the summer of 1999. The plaintiff was helping to replace a
greenhouse roof as part of his job duties when he came into contact
with a high voltage conductor installed and maintained by defendant
El Paso Electric.' 24 At trial, defendant argued that the negligence of
the plaintiff, plaintiffs employer, and two other contractors super-
seded its own negligence and "therefore, constituted independent in-
tervening causes which relieved [defendant] of liability."'' 25 The trial
court instructed the jury on independent intervening cause, which
was an affirmative defense under New Mexico law, and the jury re-
turned a special verdict finding that defendant was negligent but did
not proximately cause plaintiffs injuries.' 26 The court of appeals
certified the question of the propriety of such an instruction, and the
supreme court held that it is always improper when used with refer-
ence to a plaintiff s negligence, on the ground that it "unduly empha-
size[s] a defendant's attempt to shift fault to a plaintiff," which thus
"creates an unacceptable risk that the jury will inadvertently apply
the common law rule of contributory negligence" that the court had
abolished in 1981. '27 The court went on to say that because of the
risk of confusion, and because the standard intervening cause in-
struction largely duplicates the basic proximate cause instruction,
trial courts should no longer give separate intervening cause instruc-
tions or make explicit reference to independent intervening cause in
the proximate cause instruction in any cases involving multiple acts
of negligence.'
28
Iowa courts have cautioned that a plaintiffs negligence should
rarely be characterized as an intervening cause after the advent of
comparative negligence.' 29 In Sumpter, the plaintiff suffered a heart
attack while cleaning public ditches near his home and sued the city
123. 987 P.2d 386 (N.M. 1999).
124. See id. at389.
125. Id. at 390.
126. See id.
127. Id. at393.
128. See id. at 395.
129. See Sumpter v. City of Moulton, 519 N.W.2d 427 (Iowa Ct App.
1994).
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for its negligence in failing to keep the ditches open. 30 After a jury
verdict against him, plaintiff appealed, claiming that the trial court
erred in charging the jury that an intervening cause could free the de-
fendant from liability. On appeal, the defendant argued that "the
intervening event was Sumpter's own conduct of physically 'over-
exerting' himself in cleaning the ditch .... It was this later conduct
... which caused the heart attack and justified the intervening cause
instruction."' 3' The court rejected this doctrinal formulation on the
facts of the case, citing a number of cases for the proposition that
"[g]enerally, the doctrine of intervening cause embraces the inter-
vention of the acts of a third-party or an outside force, not the actions
of the injured plaintiff."'"32 The court acknowledged that some juris-
dictions have dissented from this general view, but pointed out that
cases using intervening cause against plaintiffs often involve "wholly
unforeseeable" conduct and acts by plaintiffs "that rise above mere
negligence."' 33  In this case, plaintiffs acts in clearing out the
ditches were "done in direct response to the failure of the city to act.
The city created the stimulus for Sumpter to act, and exposed him to
a risk of harm."'134 Thus plaintiffs acts "could not constitute an in-
tervening, superseding cause of his injury.' 35  The court's disap-
proval of the defendant's argument went beyond the facts, however;
the court said that the doctrine of superseding cause should be
"strictly limited to cases involving acts that are independent of the
alleged negligence of the defendant," because "[t]he principles of
comparative fault could be seriously diluted by utilizing the conduct
of a plaintiff as an intervening cause. The preferred approach is to
judge the conduct of the plaintiff under comparative fault.'
' 36
130. See id. at431.
131. Id. at 431-32.
132. Id. at 432 (citing Schnebly v. Baker, 217 N.W.2d 708, 729 (Iowa 1974);
see Beirne v. Security Heating-Clearwater Pools Inc., 759 F. Supp. 1120, 1123
(M.D. Pa. 1991); Blessing v. Welding, 286 N.W. 436, 439 (Iowa 1939);
Hickey v. Zezulka, 487 N.W.2d 106, 118 (Mich. 1992); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND), supra note 34, § 440.
133. Sumpter, 519 N.W.2d at432.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
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A 1991 case from the Hawaii appeals court also spoke with dis-
approval of a defendant's assertion that the plaintiffs conduct was a
superseding cause. 137 In the case, a patient sued his surgeon, alleging
that the doctor had negligently failed to obtain his informed consent
prior to the surgery on his finger and leg.138 Following the operation,
plaintiff suffered pain and discomfort in his foot and leg. 139 By spe-
cial verdict, the jury found that the doctor's negligence was not "the
legal cause" of plaintiffs harm, and on appeal the defendant argued
that the superseding cause of plaintiff s injuries was either his negli-
gently allowing his leg to become infected, or his going swimming in
the ocean after the surgery, during which time a rock hit him in the
leg. 140 The court found that neither of these acts could comprise a
superseding cause, since the numbness and pain in plaintiff's leg oc-
curred ' prior to the occurrence of the infection and the swimming in-
cident." 41 In a footnote, however, the court gave a more fundamen-
tal reason to find the superseding cause instruction erroneous: "By
definition a superseding cause is 'an act of a third person or other
force' which intervenes .... Where the plaintiffs act is the alleged
superseding cause, it constitutes contributory negligence, which 'is
negligence of the plaintiff before any damage, or any invasion of his
rights, has occurred, which bars all recovery.
',142
A federal district court in 1988 interpreted Indiana law as abol-
ishing superseding intervening cause as an all-or-nothing doctrine
following the adoption of modified comparative fault.' 43 In the case,
a long-distance trucker fell out of the bucket of a highloader that was
being used to get him out of his truck, breaking both wrists and his
back.' 44 In his suit against the company that employed the workers
who were operating the highloader, the jury found him 40% at fault
137. See Keomaka v. Zakaib, 811 P.2d 478, 478 (Haw. Ct. App. 1991).
138. See id. at482.
139. See id. at 481.
140. See id. at 485.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 485 n.6 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 34, § 440,
and PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 9, § 65, at 458).
143. See Roggow v. Mineral Processing Corp., 698 F. Supp. 1441 (S.D. Ind.
1988).
144. See id. at 1443.
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and defendant 60% at fault.145 Plaintiff appealed, claiming among
other things that the trial court erred in not giving a superseding in-
tervening cause instruction, on a theory that the defendant's employ-
ees' acts superseded any negligent act of his own. 46 Holding against
him, the court said that after the Indiana legislature's adoption of
modified comparative fault, the doctrine of superseding and inter-
vening cause is "no longer available to completely excuse the negli-
gence of the plaintiff."' 47 The court reasoned that intervening super-
seding cause, as well as last clear chance and assumed risk, were
simply "ameliorative common law doctrines designed to lessen the
harsh results of contributory negligence" and thus have no role after
the adoption of comparative fault.148 Further, and even more funda-
mentally, the court noted, "the definitions of superseding and inter-
vening cause necessarily suggest the intervention of a third party or
independent agency which excuses the negligent acts of an antece-
dent tort-feasor.' 49 Since the plaintiff failed to identify any "third
party or independent agency" whose acts intervened, the doctrine had
no possible application.1
50
Texas courts have disapproved of using sole proximate cause to
describe anything other than third-party behavior.' 51 For example, in
American Jet, Inc. v. Leyendecker, an airplane owner sued a pro-
spective purchaser of the plane, who crashed it during a test-flight.
152
On appeal, the court found it was error for the trial court to have in-
structed the jury on sole proximate cause, saying "[s]ole proximate
cause pertains to neither the conduct of the plaintiff nor that of de-
fendant but to a third party, whose conduct would be solely causative
of the occurrence at issue."'15 3 Since there was no "third party" in-
volved in the accident, any allusion to sole proximate cause was
145. See id.
146. See id. at 1444.
147. Id. at 1445.
148. Id.
149. Id. (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 736, 1289 (5th ed. 1979)).
150. Id.
151. See American Jet, Inc. v. Leyendecker, 683 S.W.2d 126, 124 (Tex. Ct
App. 1984).
152. See id. at 124.
153. Id. at 126 (citing Herrera v. Balmorhea Feeders, Inc., 539 S.W.2d 84,
86-87 (Tex. 1976)).
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improper, although harmless error in the case. 154 American Jet has
been cited as authority in subsequent Texas cases. 55
District Judge Bertelsman of the Eastern District of Kentucky
has opined in two cases that superseding intervening cause has no
role in a single plaintiff-single defendant case.' 56  He wrote in
Carlotta that "[s]uperseding cause involves the negligence of a third
party or the intervention of some natural force. The defense of su-
perseding or intervening cause as such is not properly applied to the
plaintiff s negligence."'157 Yet, he found that under Kentucky law,
sole proximate cause still had a role to play even after the adoption
of pure comparative fault.' 58 Judge Bertelsman's analysis in the
Tennyson case was quite similar. There, the driver of a car fell
asleep at the wheel with the cruise control engaged and crashed into
a tractor-trailer rig that was parked on the shoulder of the inter-
state.159 The passengers in the car sued the driver of the parked
truck, and after a jury verdict in defendant's favor, moved for judg-
ment as a matter of law and for a new trial.' 60 The plaintiffs argued
that because the defendant was negligent per se in parking on the
shoulder, his negligence had to have been a substantial factor in
causing plaintiffs' injuries.' 6' Denying both motions, the court said
that plaintiffs' arguments "confuse the doctrine of superseding cause
with general causation principles," and that superseding cause was
154. See id.
155. See Ponder v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 685 F. Supp. 1359, 1368 (E.D.
Tex. 1988) (refusing to apply sole proximate cause to plaintiff's conduct, re-
lying on American Jet); see also Carter v. Helicopter Ambulance Serv. of N.
Texas, Inc., No. 05-95-00468-CV, 1996 WL 403987, at *5 (Tex. Ct. App. July
19, 1996) (unpublished memorandum) (quoting the case with approval, but
without applying its rule); Petty v. Children's World Learning Centers, Inc.,
No. 05-94-00998-CV, 1995 WL 379522, at *4 (Tex. Ct. App. May 31, 1995)
(unpublished memorandum) (quoting the case with approval, but without ap-
plying its rule).
156. See Tennyson v. Brower, 823 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Ky. 1993) (applying
Kentucky law); Carlotta v. Warner, 601 F. Supp. 749 (E.D. Ky. 1985) (apply-
ing Kentucky law).
157. Carlotta, 601 F. Supp. at 754.
158. See id. (citing Lee v. Dutli, 403 S.W.2d 703 (Ky. 1966), and Lawhorn
v. Holloway, 346 S.W.2d 302 (Ky. 1961)).
159. See Tennyson, 823 F. Supp. at 422.
160. See id. at 422-23.
161. See id. at 422.
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"irrelevant," since plaintiffs admitted they were all in the same legal
posture as the driver for analytical purposes. 162 Instead, "[t]he jury
could well have found that the plaintiff driver's negligence was the
sole cause of the accident in the popular sense," or that "the plaintiff
driver's own negligence was so overwhelming as to negate the truck
driver's negligence."'
163
A Massachusetts court disapproved of using a plaintiffs negli-
gence as an intervening cause or sole proximate cause in a 1983 con-
version case.' 64 Plaintiff was a depositor who sued a safe deposit
company for negligently supervising its employees, whom he
charged with stealing over one hundred gold Krugerrands from his
safe deposit box. 65 Defendant argued that plaintiffs negligence in
giving an employee the key to his safe deposit box "was the sole
proximate cause of the theft.' 66 Reversing a directed verdict for de-
fendant, the appeals court concluded that it could not say as a matter
of law "that the plaintiffs conduct was the sole cause of his loss."
167
Instead, the court explained, the degree of each party's fault had to
be determined by the jury, and in a footnote added, "the plaintiff's
negligence should not be viewed as an 'intervening, or insulating
cause between the defendant's negligence and the result.' Rather,
the negligence of the plaintiff and that of the defendant are each one
of the causes without which the injury would not have occurred.'
168
Missouri, a pure state, has clearly held a plaintiffs conduct can
be a superseding cause. 169 But in dictum in a 1980 appellate opinion,
the court came to the contrary view. In Chambers v. Bunker,17 0 the
plaintiffs and defendant's cars collided at an intersection and
162. Id. at 423.
163. Id. at 424 (emphasis omitted).
164. See O'Malley v. Putnam Safe Deposit Vaults, Inc., 458 N.E.2d 752
(Mass. App. Ct. 1983).
165. See id. at 755, 757.
166. Id. at 760.
167. Id. at 760 (citation omitted).
168. Id. at 760 n.10 (quoting WILLIAM L. PROSSER, PROSSER ON TORTS 417
(4th ed. 1971)).
169. See, e.g., Williams v. Birkeness, 34 F.3d 695, 697 (8th Cir. 1994) (ap-
plying Missouri law); Eidson v. Reproductive Health Servs., 863 S.W.2d 621,
626-28 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993); Vann v. Town Topic, Inc., 780 S.W.2d 659, 661-
62 (Mo. Ct App. 1989).
170. 598 S.W.2d 204 (Mo. Ct App. 1980).
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traveled up an embankment due to defendant's failure to yield. 17
1
After a moment of calm, the intertwined cars rolled backwards down
the embankment and struck a parked car. The plaintiff sued for per-
sonal injuries as well as damage to her car. After a jury verdict for
plaintiff, defendant appealed, claiming that the court should have in-
structed the jury on intervening efficient cause on a theory that the
second collision-with the parked car-was an intervening cause
exonerating defendant from all damages. In rejecting this argument,
the court said, "the omissions and acts of either party to a damage
suit for personal injuries suffered by plaintiff cannot be a new
and independent cause. Such new and independent cause must be
ascribed to a third person or some outside agency operating to cause
the injury.,' 172 Here, the court said, "[t]he only causes involved were
those produced by plaintiff and defendant. Therefore, no intervening
efficient cause was present to interrupt the chain of events set in
force by defendant's negligence."'
173
IV. A FUNCTIONAL EVALUATION
A. The Ameliorative Function
1. The major criticism: undercutting pure comparative systems
The most pointed criticism of the use of superseding or sole
proximate cause, from courts and commentators alike, is that it un-
dercuts the very idea of pure comparative responsibility, which con-
templates that the negligent conduct of the plaintiff and defendant are
to be compared no matter what their respective amounts or degrees
of negligence. David Robertson, a frequent critic, has written that
sole proximate cause is often "pernicious" in this context:
Allowing a defendant whose negligent conduct has been
shown to be a proximate cause of the harm to escape liabil-
ity by pointing to the victim's fault as "sole proximate
cause" would amount to smuggling the abolished contribu-
tory negligence defense into these cases through the back
171. See id. at 205.
172. Id. at 207.
173. Id. at208.
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door. This "sole proximate cause" fallacy has been widely
debunked in the general comparative fault literature.
74
His criticisms of using superseding cause analysis against plaintiffs
have been to the same point, and equally unyielding. 7 5 A Missouri
scholar-practitioner has opined:
Intervening cause should not be allowed to undermine the
allocation of fault system by injecting contributory negli-
gence under another name. One way to assure that the
doctrine of superseding cause does not become another
name for contributory negligence ... is for the Supreme
Court of Missouri to follow the rule [that] acts of neither
party can be a superseding cause.
176
Similarly, an Illinois scholar-practitioner concludes that "[a] defen-
dant's assertion that a plaintiffs conduct was the sole proximate
cause of injury has the effect of circumventing and barring compara-
tive negligence rules.... In effect, sole proximate cause defeats the
purpose of a comparative negligence system and simply replaces
contributory negligence with a pseudonym."' 177 A student author,
writing about a 1985 Wyoming Supreme Court case that used such
an analysis, concluded that "[s]uch a harsh result is unnecessary
174. David W. Robertson, The Texas Employer's Liability in Tort for Inju-
ries to an Employee Occurring in the Course of the Employment, 24 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 1195, 1200 (1993); see also David W. Robertson, The Vocabu-
lary of Negligence Law: Continuing Causation Confusion, 58 LA. L. REV. 1,
29-32 (1997) [hereinafter Robertson, Causation Confusion] (arguing that
holding a plaintiff's negligence as sole proximate cause or intervening super-
seding cause reintroduces contributory negligence or implied assumption of
risk into the law, and makes the plaintiff prove something on which the defen-
dant should have the burden of proof).
175. See David W. Robertson, Love and Fury: Recent Radical Revisions to
the Law of Comparative Fault, 59 LA. L. REV. 175, 196 (1998) [hereinafter
Robertson, Love and Fury] (criticizing Exxon v. Sofec's use of superseding
cause analysis as an "infamous instance" of the reintroduction of the contribu-
tory negligence bar "into what was supposedly a pure comparative fault sys-
tem").
176. Timothy H. Bosler, Comparative Fault and the Personal Injury De-
fenses of Mitigation and Intervening Cause, 52 J. Mo. B. 216, 219 (1996) (ci-
tations omitted).
177. John G. Phillips, The Sole Proximate Cause "Defense": A Misfit in the
World of Contribution and Comparative Negligence, 22 S. ILL. U. L.J. 1, 15
(1997).
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when the rules of comparative negligence are employed." 78 Another
recent student-authored note argues that superseding cause analysis
"effectively undermines the American system of pure comparative
fault."'179 Yet another recent piece asserts flatly that superseding
cause analysis is "logically inconsistent" with pure comparative
fault.'8 0 At bottom, this author asserts, "the term 'superseding cause'
should be dropped entirely in comparative fault contexts, including
maritime law."' 81
It may be true that barring a negligent plaintiff entirely on any
number of doctrinal grounds seems logically inconsistent with a truly
pure comparative systen. But what most of these criticisms fail to
recognize is that logical inconsistency does not necessarily undercut
a legal construct that must be more than "logical" in order to survive
in the real world of law. At times, and this is but one such instance,
a theoretically pure and even simple system must have some messy
and inconsistent safety valves to prevent it from becoming obses-
sively pure and simple. Thus, as more fully argued below, some
"rough edges" tend to preserve, not undercut, otherwise theoretically
seamless legal systems such as pure comparative responsibility.
2. The role of legal fictions
Any attempt to analyze the ameliorative functions served by ap-
plying superseding cause to plaintiffs' conduct should begin by ac-
knowledging that the doctrine, like the great trunk of proximate
cause on which it is but a branch, has little if anything to do with
"causation." As Prosser & Keeton's hornbook aptly puts it, "the
problem is not primarily one of causation at all, since it does not
178. Jay T. Hopkins, Note, Should a Plaintiff's Intervening Act Be an Abso-
lute Defense Under Comparative Negligence?, 21 LAND & WATER L. REv.
591, 602 (1986).
179. Kelsey L. Joyce Hooke, Comment, Collision at Sea: The Irreconci-
lability of the Superseding Cause and Pure Comparative Fault Doctrines in
Admiralty, 74 WAsH. L. REv. 159, 187 (1999).
180. Terry Christlieb, Note, Why Superseding Cause Analysis Should Be
Abandoned, 72 TEX. L. REV. 161, 181 (1993). Christlieb's points were relied
upon heavily in Torres v. El Paso Elec. Co., 987 P.2d 386 (N.M. 1999), in
which the New Mexico Supreme Court disapproved the use of intervening su-
perseding cause analysis against plaintiffs as well as in multiple-party cases.
See infra notes 114-19.
181. Christlieb, supra note 180, at 181.
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arise until cause in fact is established. It is rather one of the policy as
to imposing legal liability."' 8 2 Ultimately, the doctrine is addressed
to "problems of responsibility, and not physics.... The question is
always one of whether the defendant is to be relieved of responsibil-
ity, and the defendant's liability superseded, by the subsequent
event."'183 Thus one would expect the doctrine, when invoked, to
serve policy ends--the goals of "practical politics," in Judge An-
drews's words-and not necessarily either logic or physics. A look
below the surface indicates that this is indeed the case.
At the outset, it must also be recognized that this area of law is
replete with legal fictions, situations in which courts consciously use
one term or set of terms when they actually rest their opinion on
some other principle. 184 There is, of course, a heavy dose of legal
fiction in the term "proximate cause" itself, thus also in the terms
"sole proximate cause" and "superseding cause," because, as noted
above, these legal terms do not truly involve causation at all.' 85 The
question of whether a superseding cause exists is just a disguised
way of making a normative judgment about whether a particular de-
fendant bears legal responsibility for the plaintiffs injury. "Again
the issue is merely one of the policy which imposes liability," as
Prosser said, "and any attempt to deal with it in the language of...
causation can lead only to perplexity and bewilderment." 
86
3. Revival of the slight/gross or major/minor fault doctrine
Superseding cause and sole proximate cause may be seen, par-
ticularly in those states whose legislatures have adopted pure com-
parative schemes, as a way for the judiciary to accomplish a slight
modification of that scheme--to develop, as it were, a judicially-
constructed amelioration to soften a pure scheme's harsh effects on
182. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 9, § 44, at 301.
183. Id. at302.
184. See LoN L. FULLER, LEGAL FIcTIONs 7, 10 (1967) (defining a legal
fiction as an "expedient but consciously false, assumption," a statement which
"is frequently a metaphorical way of expressing a truth").
185. See id. at 51 ("[T]he purpose of any fiction is to reconcile a specific le-
gal result with some premise or postulate.").
186. William L. Prosser, Proximate Cause in California, 38 CAL. L. REv.
369, 398 (1950) [hereinafter Proximate Cause].
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defendants.1 7 In this situation, invocation of the doctrines of super-
seding or sole proximate cause may be seen as a kind of legal fiction
a judge sometimes uses "for the purpose of concealing from himself
or others the fact that he is legislating . . . .",s This should not be
surprising to anyone aware of the history of the ameliorating doc-
trines that sprung up in response to the Butterfield all-or-nothing
scheme that barred the slightly negligent plaintiff from all recovery.
Just as judges stepped in to create exceptions and special rules to get
around unjust results in particular kinds of cases, to avoid making the
slightly faulty plaintiff bear an entire loss, judges may now be step-
ping in to create (or more properly, revive) some special rules to
avoid making the slightly faulty defendant pay the overwhelmingly
faulty plaintiff a very large sum of money.
In essence, the phenomenon at work here is the subtle judicial
adoption, in the guise of superseding or sole proximate cause, of a
kind of "major/minor" fault doctrine of the sort once used in admi-
ralty collision cases, or a kind of modified "slight/gross" fault
scheme that has been used in a small number of states since the mid-
nineteenth century. Again, when used in a state whose legislature
has adopted pure comparative responsibility, this is a judicial modifi-
cation of a statutory scheme; when used in one of the states whose
high court has adopted such a scheme, it merely represents some ju-
dicial "fine-tuning."
As explained by the Supreme Court, admiralty's major/minor
fault rule was used "to find a grossly negligent party solely at fault,"
and served as an ameliorating doctrine in an allocation scheme under
which damages were equally divided among all responsible parties,
regardless of their degrees of fault or causation. 89 That is, under a
system in which a defendant who was one of two responsible actors
in causing a collision at sea would be made to pay one-half of
the damages regardless of his degree of fault, there arose this
187. Cf PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 9, at 457 n.56 ("A creative use of
the sole proximate cause doctrine may be the most effective means of reme-
dying the quandary of the slightly negligent plaintiff."). What some courts
have done, in fact, is turn this conception on its head to deal with the "slightly
negligent defendant"
188. FULLER, supra note 184, at 63-64.
189. See United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 406 (1975)
(citing City of New York, 147 U.S. 72, 85 (1893)).
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major/minor fault rule that freed that defendant from paying anything
if his fault was slight, shifting complete responsibility onto the party
whose fault was comparatively great.190 This rule, purportedly died
along with the divided damages rule, replaced by a pure comparative
system.19
The history of the land-based slight/gross scheme is somewhat
more obscure. In the mid-nineteenth century, a handful of states, led
by Illinois, 9 2 experimented with a system under which the negligent
plaintiff would normally be barred from recovery (in accordance
with the basic rule of Butterfield), but not if the plaintiff's negligence
was "slight" and the defendant's "gross," in which case the plaintiff
could recover 100% of his damages. 93 This scheme proved imprac-
ticable (for one thing, the definition of "slight" was sufficiently un-
certain as to produce too many appeals), and was ultimately super-
seded by ameliorating doctrines like last clear chance. 194  An
improved variant of the slight/gross system was adopted, however, in
South Dakota and Nebraska in the first half of the twentieth century,
pursuant to which a slightly negligent plaintiff could recover dam-
ages against a grossly negligent defendant but would have his dam-
ages reduced by the percentage of negligence attributed to him.195
South Dakota currently follows a scheme under which a plaintiff's
negligence "shall not bar a recovery when.., slight in comparison
with the negligence of the defendant .... ,196 In essence, what some
courts are doing in invoking superseding or sole proximate cause to
190. See, e.g., Villain & Fassio E Compagnia v. Tank Steamer E.W. Sinclair,
207 F. Supp. 700, 712 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), affd, 313 F.2d 722 (2d Cir. 1963)
(holding that the "gross faults" of one ship "so flagrantly and heavily outweigh
any passive fault" of the other that the "'interests of justice are best served by
condemning the more culpable vessel completely"').
191. See Reliable Transfer, 421 U.S. at 410-11. For a brief history and
analysis of this rule and its demise, see Hooke, supra note 179, at 161-68.
192. See Galena & Chicago Union R.R. Co. v. Jacobs, 20 Ill. 478, 497
(1858).
193. See SCHwARTZ, supra note 6, § 3-4, at 70. The other states were Ore-
gon, Wisconsin, and Tennessee. See id. (citing William L. Prosser, Compara-
tive Negligence, 51 MICH. L. REV. 465, 485 (1953)). Tennessee's "remote
contributory negligence" doctrine is well summarized in Mutter, supra note 24,
at 214-27.
194. See SCHwARTZ, supra note 6, § 3-4(a), at 70.
195. See id. at 72.
196. S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 20-9-2 (Michie 1995).
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bar negligent plaintiffs in pure comparative states is the essential op-
posite of this slight/gross scheme: A plaintiff's recovery may be
barred where the plaintiff's negligence is "gross" in comparison with
the "slight" negligence of the defendant. In a rare example of judi-
cial non-fiction, Judge Bertelsman said this fairly explicitly in the
Carlotta case:
The salutary adoption of the comparative negligence doc-
trine by the Supreme Court of Kentucky resolved many
problems in negligence law, but not all. One of those re-
maining is presented here, that of the slightly negligent de-
fendant versus the profoundly negligent plaintiff. The doc-
trine of comparative negligence does not mean that plaintiff
is entitled to a recovery in some amount in every situation
in which he can show some negligence of the defendant,
however slight .... Where, as here, the defendant's negli-
gence is very slight in relation to the negligence of the
plaintiff. . . the law of causation becomes of paramount
importance.
197
Judge Bertelsman held that the defendant was entitled to summary
judgment because the plaintiffs negligence in diving through an in-
nertube and breaking his neck was the sole proxiinate cause of his
harm, freeing the defendant pool owner from all damages.' 98 He
stressed that the plaintiffs damages in the case "could easily be in
the millions," and thus "[a]n apportionment against the defendant in
even a small percentage could result in a liabilty of hundreds of thou-
sands of dollars when the only fault of the defendant was in failing to
prevent the plaintiffs deliberately creating an obvious risk and pur-
posefully subjecting himself to it."
199
Cases that say that a plaintiffs conduct must be particularly
blameworthy in order to constitute a superseding or sole proximate
cause are fully consonant with this functional revival of the ma-
jor/minor or slight/gross rule as well. To take a recent example, in
Miller v. Town of Fenton, plaintiffs car was struck by defendant's
train at a rural crossing that had no signal lights or gates.2 00 The trial
197. Carlotta v. Warner, 601 F. Supp. 749, 751-52 (E.D. Ky. 1985).
198. See id. at 755.
199. Id. at 752.
200. See 669 N.Y.S.2d 391,391-92 (1998).
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court granted summary judgment for defendant on the ground that
"plaintiff's conduct was the sole or superseding cause of the accident
.... ,201 The appeals court reversed, concluding that "we cannot say,
as a matter of law, that plaintiffs actions were so culpable that they
must be deemed a superseding cause of the accident., 20 2 The court
added that the plaintiff's act of approaching the crossing in a manner
that she could not stop in time was not a "deliberately reckless act"
so "as to compel the conclusion that it is the only legal cause of an
ensuing collision., 20 3 A dissenting judge said he agreed with the trial
judge, that "plaintiffs conduct must be viewed as sufficiently reck-
less to interrupt the causal connection between the negligence as-
cribed to defendant and her injuries. 20 4 A number of New York
courts have applied a similar formulation, saying that summary
judgment is proper on grounds of plaintiffs superseding cause when
the plaintiffs conduct is "reckless. ' ' 0' These cases purportedly turn
on the "unforeseeability" of the plaintiff's acts, stating that when an
act is "reckless," it becomes, in law, "unforeseeable." This is yet an-
other legal fiction, labeling an act unforeseeable when the operative
ground for decision is that the plaintiff's act is far more culpable than
that of defendant. 0 6
201. Id. at393.
202. Id. (emphasis added).
203. Id.
204. Id. at 395 (Carpinello, J., dissenting).
205. See, e.g., Caraballo v. United States, 830 F.2d 19 (2d Cir. 1987) (find-
ing plaintiff s reckless dive into shallow water a superseding cause under New
York law); Olsen v. Town of Richfield, 616 N.E.2d 498 (N.Y. 1993) (sole
proximate cause of swimmer's injury was his reckless dive off bridge into
shallow creek); Howard v. Poseidon Pools, Inc., 530 N.E.2d 1280 (N.Y. 1988)
(affirming summary judgments against plaintiffs who dove into shallow pools);
Boltax v. Joy Day Camp, 490 N.E.2d 527 (N.Y. 1986) (affirming summary
judgment where plaintiff dove into shallow water); Lionarons v. General Elec-
tric Co., 626 N.Y.S.2d 321 (App. Div. 1995) (affirming summary judgment
where plaintiff dove into shallow water); Shutak v. Handler, 599 N.Y.S.2d 24
(App. Div. 1993) (denying summary judgment where tenant fell off chair try-
ing to repair ceiling); Walter v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 598 N.Y.S.2d
416 (App. Div. 1993) (denying summary judgment where plaintiff dove into
shallow water).
206. David Robertson has been quite critical of this kind of approach: "If
the only thing that makes the victim's injury unforeseeable was the egregious-
ness of the victim's fault, the core command of the pure percentage fault sys-
tem is that the victim takes a very high percentage assignment but is not
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The maritime case of Exxon v. Sofec is another good example of
this major/minor or slight/gross phenomenon, especially when one
focuses on the facts recited in the Ninth Circuit opinion.20 7 The trial
judge in the case found the plaintiffs ship's captain "extraordinarily
negligent" in failing to plot the ship's position, failing to anchor,
failing to ask for help from the Coast Guard or other ships, failing to
back the vessel far enough from the shore, and deciding to linger un-
necessarily too near the shore, all of which conduct constituted "the
sole proximate, and thus the superseding, cause of the ship's loss.
20 8
The Ninth Circuit said these findings were well supported in the rec-
ord in affirming, saying, 'the district court did not err in finding
Captain Coyne's extraordinary negligence to be the sole proximate
and superseding cause of the damage to the [ship]. 20 9 Indeed, the
trial court even labeled the captain's negligence "gross" at one
point. 210 The defendants were allegedly negligent only in connection
with the failing of a single point mooring system that allowed the
ship to break away in the first place.21 ' The Captain's negligence
was far more extensive; as the court of appeals said:
Captain Coyne had ample time, as well as opportunity and
available manpower, to take precautions which would have
eliminated the risk of grounding, and ... his failure to do so
amounted to extraordinary negligence, superseding any
negligence of the defendants with regard to the breakout or
provision of safe berth after the breakout.21 2
The Supreme Court's approval of the use of superseding cause
to bar a negligent plaintiff has been roundly criticized as a revival of
the major/minor fault rule that had been repudiated in Reliable
barred." Robertson, Love and Fury, supra note 175, at 190 n.36; cf H.L.A.
HART & TONY HONORE, CAUSATION IN THE LAw 282 (2d ed. 1985) ("[C]ourts
often adhere to the causal doctrine that a voluntary intervention, even if fore-
seeable, may exclude defendant's liability, but do this in a disguised form by
calling such events 'unforeseeable'. So voluntary interventions come to be
called 'unforeseeable', whether they are really improbable or not.").
207. 54 F.3d 570 (9th Cir. 1995), aff'd, 517 U.S. 830 (1996).
208. Id. at 577-78.
209. Id. at 579.
210. Id. at 576.
211. See id. at 572.
212. Id. at 579.
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Transfer.2 1 3 But far from demonstrating that the Sofec Court's appli-
cation of superseding cause was bizarre or ill-advised, however, this
unanimous functional "revival" of the major/minor fault rule in this
particular guise evidences the compelling need for ameliorating doc-
trines in pure systems to avoid awarding damages to plaintiffs whose
fault is extraordinary (or "gross" or "major") compared to a defen-
dant's whose negligence is "slight" or "minor." In short, even in the
"pure" system of admiralty, courts are wisely reluctant to allow any
apportionment of damages against a defendant whose negligence is
truly minor compared to that of the plaintiff. And a handy, hardy,
and flexible doctrine with which to accomplish that result is super-
seding or sole proximate cause.
B. The Proxy Function
At times, the doctrines of superseding and sole proximate cause
merely serve as proxies for other doctrines. Commentators have
been especially critical of the use of these doctrines as proxies for af-
firmative defenses. One writer has argued that superseding cause is
functionally identical to other absolute defenses, such as contributory
negligence, last clear chance, assumption of risk, and known and ob-
vious danger, and is inconsistent with the law when those defenses
have themselves been abrogated.214 Another argues forcefully that
when matters that should be considered part of an affirmative de-
fense are recast as part of the plaintiffs prima facie case, this im-
properly shifts to the plaintiff something on which the defendant
rightfully bears the burden of proof, and may represent a "back-
door" way to force the plaintiff to disprove his own contributory
negligence. 21 5 However, the use of these doctrines as proxies for
abrogated affirmative defenses does not appear nearly as common
as their use as additional grounds of decision where valid defenses
also bar the claim. For example, in a state that continues to view im-
plied assumption of risk as a complete defense, 16 it would not be
213. See Hooke, supra note 179, at 177.
214. See Hopkins, supra note 178, at 602.
215. See Robertson, Causation Confusion, supra note 174, at 29.
216. Most states no longer do so, after the adoption of comparative responsi-
bility. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD): APPORTIONMENT, supra note 17, § 2, Re-
porter's Note, at 29.
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inconsistent for a court to conclude that plaintiff is barred either be-
cause he knowingly encountered a risk, or because his negligence
intervened between his injury and the antecedent negligence of the
defendant, thus becoming the "sole proximate cause." For example,
in McGowan, a federal district court applying Mississippi law was
faced with a case in which a truck driver was injured when he
slipped on grease on a loading ramp and sued the landowner.217 Af-
ter a bench trial, the court found for defendant on a host of alterna-
tive grounds. First, the court said, the hazard was open and obvious
to the plaintiff, freeing defendant from any duty to warn him?'
8
Second, there was no proof that defendant knew of the hazard or
failed to correct it; thus, there was no evidence of any negligence by
defendant. 219 The court further noted that under Mississippi law,
plaintiff was 'precluded from recovery ... by the doctrine of as-
sumption of risk," since "his negligence was the sole proximate
cause of the injury., 220 Mississippi law is identical on the "defense"
of a plaintiff's unforeseeable misuse of a product.22 '
The proxy function occurs much more commonly with elements
of the prima facie case. Generally, this function of the doctrines is
harmless, although admittedly, redundancy may augment existing
doctrinal confusion. As one early scholar put it:
[I]t is difficult to make progress in developing the princi-
ples of legal cause if the conception of it overlaps the other
elements in a case more than necessary. So many cases
say that the defendant was not the proximate cause when
some other bar to liability is much more easily and
217. See McGowan v. St Regis Paper Co., 419 F. Supp. 742 (S.D. Miss.
1976).
218. See id. at 745.
219. See id.
220. Id. (quoting Braswell v. Economy Supply Co., 281 So. 2d 669, 677
(Miss. 1973)).
221. See, e.g., Miller v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 880 F. Supp. 474
(S.D. Miss. 1994) (under Mississippi law, misuse is a form of contributory
negligence that may bar plaintiffs recovery if it was the "sole proximate
cause" of plaintiffs injury or loss).
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satisfactorily applicable that this caution can be emphasized
scarcely enough.
222
Another asserts that certain uses of the superseding cause doctrine
merely add a "bevy of confusing terminology" to general concep-
tions of proximate cause.
2 3
These criticisms aside, it can hardly be considered controversial
to bar a plaintiff, negligent or not, based on a failure of the prima fa-
cie case. A plaintiff has the burden of proving, by a preponderance
of the evidence, that the defendant owed plaintiff a duty, breached
that duty, and by that breach (negligent conduct) actually and proxi-
mately caused legally cognizable harm. A change from contributory
negligence as a complete bar to a comparative scheme was never de-
signed to shift that basic burden of proof A plaintiff who fails to
prove any one of these elements by a preponderance of the evidence
cannot and should not recover; conversely, a defendant against
whom any one of these elements is not proved should not be made to
pay.
Obviously, perhaps, the most frequent proxy use of superseding
or sole proximate cause is to explain with some greater particularity
why the plaintiff has failed to prove that the defendant was not a
proximate cause of the plaintiffs harm. 2 4 As one recent court put it
in an auto accident case, the defendant's argument that plaintiffs
negligence was "the sole proximate cause" of the crash "is but an in-
verted way of asserting that as a matter of law [defendant's] negli-
gence, if any, was not a proximate cause of the accident and, there-
fore, that [plaintiff] cannot prove the causation element of her case in
chief. '225 The element of proximate cause itself has some "substan-
tial factor" limit built in; that is, negligent conduct that was an actual
cause of harm will not be seen as a proximate cause at all where it
222. James Angel McLaughlin, Proximate Cause, 39 HARV. L. REv. 149,
153 (1925).
223. Hooke, supra note 179, at 188.
224. Cf Christlieb, supra note 180, at 183 (arguing that many cases in which
superseding cause term is used would have been more clearly analyzed by
simply using the term proximate cause).
225. Smith v. Fourre, 858 P.2d 276, 279 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that
the argument fails, since there were sufficient inferences that defendant was
negligent).
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was something less than a substantial factor in causing that harm?226
In a state that has adopted the Restatement formulation, or something
like it, the jury (or the judge, if reasonable jurors could not disagree)
makes a judgment about substantiality of causation on an all-or-
nothing basis at the outset, as part of judging the plaintiff's prima fa-
cie case (and the defendant's prima facie case of contributory negli-
gence) and before any comparison is undertaken. Thus, when a
judge or jury decides that a plaintiffs own conduct is a superseding
or sole proximate cause and bars the claim on that ground, such us-
age is entirely consistent with the inherent flexibility of proximate
cause itself, and not at all inconsistent with any particular allocation
scheme that applies only after liability itself is established. Theoreti-
cally, at least, "adoption of comparative negligence should have no
effect on the rules of proximate causation obtaining in the particular
jurisdiction.,
227
Some might complain that barring a plaintiffs recovery on the
ground that his negligence was a far more significant cause of his
own harm than was defendant's negligence is inconsistent with pure
comparison. In most pure states, this is clearly not so, because what
is purportedly being compared is "fault," or "negligence," not "cau-
,,228 hssation. In those states, there is no arguable inconsistency in
holding a defendant not liable on the ground that his causal contribu-
tion was so insignificant (compared to that of the plaintiff) that the
plaintiffs prima facie case fails for want of proof. In a few pure
states, however, the legislature itself has approved of a kind of com-
parative causation at the damages allocation stage; for example,
Michigan's statute provides: "In determining the percentages of
fault. . . , the trier of fact shall consider both the nature of the con-
duct of each person at fault and the extent of the causal relation be-
tween the conduct and the damages claimed., 229 The problem here is
226. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 34, § 431 (providing
that conduct is "legal cause of harm to another" if it is "a substantial factor in
bringing about the harnf').
227. SPEISERETAL., supra note 18, § 13:22, at 752.
228. See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 1411 (McKinney 1997) (calling for plaintiff's
damages to be reduced "in the proportion which the culpable conduct attribut-
able to the claimant or decedent bears to the culpable conduct which caused the
damages").
229. MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.6304(2) (West 1999).
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indeed more pronounced. Judges who utilize superseding or sole
proximate cause to determine a defendant's non-liability under a
statute like Michigan' s23 0 -that is, to bar a plaintiff from ever
reaching the allocation-of-damages phase on the ground that the
"causal relation" between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiffs
harm is so attenuated that the defendant is not liable at all--must do
so with some care to avoid being directly at odds with the statutory
scheme. This is so because the statute itself appears to dictate that
the comparison of percentages should be done even where one party
is overwhelmingly-even 99 0/o-the cause of the harm. Mandating a
comparison of causal contribution after liability is found, however,
can hardly be seen as repealing the basic rules of proximate cause
which, as noted above, have long provided a doctrinally sound way
to free a remotely negligent party from legal responsibility.
230. In addition to Michigan, three other pure states have a statutory alloca-
tion scheme that explicitly takes causation into account. Alaska's statute pro-
vides that "In determining the percentages of fault, the trier of fact shall con-
sider both the nature of the conduct of each person at fault, and the extent of
the causal relation between the conduct and the damages claimed." ALASKA
STAT. §§ 09.17.080(b) (Michie 1998). Kentucky's statute provides: "In de-
termining the percentages of fault, the trier of fact shall consider both the na-
ture of the conduct of each party at fault and the extent of the causal relation
between the conduct and the damages claimed." KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
411.182(2) (Michie 1992). Washington's statute provides:
Legal requirements of causal relation apply both to fault as the basis
for liability and to contributory fault A comparison of fault for any
purpose under RCW 4.22.005 through 4.22.060 shall involve consid-
eration of both the nature of the conduct of the parties to the action
and the extent of the causal relation between such conduct and the
damages.
WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.015 (West 1988); see also UNIF. COMPARATIVE
FAULT ACT § 2, 12 U.L.A. 135 (1977), reprinted in SCHWARTZ, supra note 6,
§ 22-4, at 459 ("In determining the percentages of fault, the trier of fact shall
consider both the nature of the conduct of each party at fault and the extent of
the causal relation between the conduct and the damages claimed."). Louisiana
courts have said that both fault and causation are to be considered in arriving at
percentages of responsibility in its pure system. See, e.g., Page v. Gilbert, 598
So. 2d 1110 (La. Ct App. 1992); Jaffarzad v. Jones Truck Lines, Inc., 561 So.
2d 144 (La. Ct. App. 1990). New Mexico has suggested something similar.
See Bartlett v. New Mexico Welding Supply, Inc., 646 P.2d 579, 585 (N.M.
Ct App. 1982) ("We are unwilling.., to say that although fault may be ap-
portioned, causation cannot If the jury can do one, it can do the other.").
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Two simple New York cases illustrate this kind of usage. In
Bank v. Lincoln Shore Owners, Inc., the eighty-three-year-old plain-
tiff lived in an apartment building in which one elevator was not
working.23 She walked up one flight of stairs to the roof in order to
get to a working elevator in another part of the building and while
walking down the stairs from the roof, slipped and fell. 232 She sued
Otis Elevator "on the theory that its failure to maintain the elevator"
was a proximate cause of her harm. 233 Ordering the complaint dis-
missed, the appellate division commented simply, "as a matter of
law, Otis Elevator's failure to have the elevator in operation was not
a proximate cause of Mrs. Bank's injuries., 234 Can this result be ex-
plained by Otis Elevator's lack of negligence? It seems not. A lack
of cause in fact? No. Was it that Mrs. Bank was not a foreseeable
plaintiff, or that the kind of harm she suffered was not a reasonably
foreseeable result of the elevator company's negligence? Unlikely.
The true reason appears to be that her act of walking up and down
the stairs, and slipping on the way down, had a great deal more to do
with producing her harm than anything Otis Elevator did or did not
do.
In the second example, Rubin v. Pecoraro, the plaintiff walked
suddenly from between two parked cars without looking and ran into
the side of defendant's speeding car.23 5 The appeals court reinstated
the jury's verdict for defendant, based on its finding that the defen-
dant motorist was negligent but that the plaintiffs negligence was
the sole proximate cause of the harm. 236 The court said "we can
properly consider the injured plaintiffs actions, not on the issue of
comparative negligence, but on the totality of the proof in the jury's
evaluation of the issue of proximate cause. 2 37 The court opined that
perhaps the jury had concluded that the defendant's negligence
in driving too fast, not looking, and not sounding a horn was simply
not a substantial factor-that is, not a substantial causative factor
231. See 644 N.Y.S.2d 554, 555 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996).
232. See id. at 554-55.
233. Id. at 555.
234. Id.
235. See 529 N.Y.S.2d 142, 142-43 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988).
236. See id. at 143-44.
237. Id. at 144.
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when compared to what the plaintiff contributed-in plaintiffs
harm
238
Sometimes courts label a plaintiffs conduct a superseding or
sole proximate cause when they could just have easily said that the
plaintiff failed to prove actual ("but for") cause. In this usage, the
courts use superseding or sole proximate cause as a proxy for a con-
clusion that "even if the defendant had done everything he should,
the plaintiff still would have suffered the same injury., 239 A good
example of this is found in a 1990 Florida case in which an eleven-
year-old boy was injured when he fell from a piece of playground
equipment owned and maintained by defendant homeowners' asso-
ciation.240 His lawsuit alleged that the defendant's negligence in
failing to adequately maintain the equipment was a proximate cause
of his injuries. The court, affirming a summary judgment for defen-
dant, said, "although faulty maintenance was alleged, this is of no
consequence, as the proximate cause of [plaintiffs] injuries was that
of his own careless attempt to jump from the monkey bar to the
slide.",241 While the court explicitly rested its ruling on "sole proxi-
mate cause," and quoted with approval a case denying recovery on
242grounds of "superceding" [sic] cause, the most obvious ground for
decision is that even had the playground equipment been properly
maintained, plaintiff would still have been injured when he attempted
his athletic but ill-fated leap.
At times, too, courts appear to use the superseding or sole
proximate cause label to buttress or stand in for a conclusion that the
defendant was not negligent, that is, that the defendant did not breach
a duty. A half-century ago, Prosser identified "many cases" where
the court applied superseding cause analysis to free defendants from
liability "in which no harm at all was reasonably to be anticipated,
either from the intervening cause or as the direct result of the defen-
dant's conduct. The proper holding in such cases is certainly that the
defendant is not negligent, rather than that there is no 'proximate
238. See id. at 143-44.
239. SCHWARTZ, supra note 6, § 21-6(b), at 439.
240. See Ruiz v. Westbrooke Lake Homes, Inc., 559 So. 2d 1172, 1173 (Fla.
Dist Ct. App. 1990).
241. Id. at 1174.
242. Id.
BUTTERFIELD RIDES AGAIN
cause."' 243  The advent of pure comparative responsibility has not
diminished this usage. As a more recent court put it,
A California plaintiff must still establish a prima facie case
by proving that the defendant was negligent, and that that
negligence was a proximate cause of his injuries ...
Where either element of proof is lacking a nonsuit is justi-
fied, and the label 'sole proximate cause' may properly be
applied to plaintiff s conduct.2"
A good example is found in Burton v. City of Philadelphia,245 a 1991
Mississippi case. A pedestrian tripped on a hole in a city sidewalk
and sued for her injuries. The court affirmed a summary judgment
against her, noting first that "our comparative negligence law in this
state applies and, unless the plaintiff's negligence is the sole proxi-
mate cause of the injury, the plaintiff is entitled to recover., 246 But
on the undisputed facts that the city did not cause the hole, did not
have notice of the hole, and had not failed to correct it after any al-
leged notice, the court concluded that "there was no showing of [de-
fendant's] negligence . . . since the record reflects that appellant's
negligence was the sole approximate [sic] cause of the accident., 2
47
The dissent argued that the court's determination was at odds with
pure comparative fault, saying, "we often fail to remember that any
percentage finding of negligence against the defendant can result in a
verdict for the plaintiff.,
248
Superseding or sole proximate cause may also serve as a proxy
for a conclusion of "no duty" on defendant's part to protect a par-
ticular plaintiff from a particular type of harm. This is, of course,
Judge Cardozo's idea as expressed in Palsgraf, that defendants owe
duties of care only to foreseeable plaintiffs. 49 Cardozo thus cast a
243. Prosser, Proximate Cause, supra note 186, at 407 n.183 (citing 17 Cali-
fornia cases decided between 1889 and 1941).
244. Elder v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 66 Cal. App. 3d 650, 657, 136 Cal.
Rptr. 203, 206 (Ct. App. 1977) (citations omitted).
245. 595 So. 2d 1279 (Miss. 1991).
246. Id. at 1280.
247. Id. at 1281.
248. Id. (McRae, J., dissenting).
249. See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 99 (N.Y. 1928)
("The conduct of the defendant's guard, if a wrong in its relation to the holder
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question of proximate causation as a question of duty, over Judge
Andrews's vigorous dissent.5 ° Prosser regarded the problem of in-
tervening cause in this way. After discussing a line of intervening
cause cases, he concluded, "The issue here is not one of causation,
which is beyond all dispute, but of whether the defendant was under
any duty to protect the plaintiff against the intervening cause. Once
that question is answered in the affirmative, nothing whatever re-
mains to be said."25' Some leading scholars, the foremost being
Leon Green, have argued that proximate cause questions should be
generally recast in this way. He observed that "most courts when
they talk about proximate cause are dealing with some phase of the
duty problem and not causal relation. 2 52  That is because "[t]he
problems dealt with under 'proximate causation' involve limitations
upon legal responsibility or legal protection-the phase of legal the-
ory concerned with rights and duties., 253 From this perspective, a
number of cases invoking superseding or sole proximate cause as the
rationale for decisions are actually being decided on the ground that
the defendant's duty does not (or probably does not) encompass
protecting this plaintiff from his own conduct.25 4 Take, for example,
the class of cases in which the plaintiff's injury resulted from an un-
lucky encounter with an "open and obvious" hazard on defendant's
property.255 Before the advent of comparative responsibility, such
of the package, was not a wrong in its relation to the plaintiff.... Relatively to
her it was not negligence at all.").
250. See id. at 105 (Andrews, J., dissenting) (arguing that duty was a broader
concept, and that the jury should have been allowed to decide proximate cau-
sation either way).
251. Prosser, Proximate Cause, supra note 186, at 401.
252. LEON GREEN, JuDGE AND JURY 242 (1930).
253. Id. at 196.
254. See, e.g., Vann v. Town Topic, Inc., 780 S.W.2d 659, 661-62 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1989) (holding that defendant bar owner owed no duty to plaintiff to
protect him from injury in fight outside the bar, but nonetheless saying that
"[t]he sole and precipitating cause of the attack on appellant was his decision
to intervene in the melee").
255. While the "open and obvious" hazard cases provide the best examples,
other kinds of cases may also illustrate this "no duty" proxy function, such as
negligent misrepresentation and fraud cases in which the plaintiff must prove
"reasonable reliance" on the defendant's misrepresentation as part of the prima
facie case. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 537, 552 (1977). In such
cases, the defendant's duty is not to make misrepresentations upon which a
reasonable person would rely, but some courts recast this as an issue of
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cases could be decided against plaintiffs on any number of doctrinal
grounds. In a pure comparative scheme, however, the options are
more limited. But courts often wish, for commonsense reasons, to
authorize a jury to deny all recovery. When they so wish, they may
allow the jury to conclude that the plaintiff's act in encountering the
hazard was a superseding or sole proximate cause. For example, in
Reese v. Griffith,256 a Louisiana court affirmed a jury verdict for
landowners in a slip-and-fall case. The appeals court noted that a
landowner's "duty does not give rise to liability for injuries ... if the
danger should have been observed by the plaintiff in the exercise of
reasonable care, or if it was as obvious to the individual as to the
owner (or occupier) of the property., 257 The court, however, cast the
case as one involving proximate causation, not duty. The plaintiff,
who tripped over a dark-colored obstacle eight inches high that was
protruding between parking spaces, "admitted attempting to take a
short-cut over the planter to his car because of the inclement
weather. '258 On these facts, the court found "no manifest error in the
jury's finding," since "the jury may have believed that the accident
was caused, legally and factually, through the plaintiffs own
fault. '259 Thus the defendants paid nothing, despite the court's find-
ing that they knew of the protruding object and "refused to correct it"
even though it "create[d] an unreasonable risk of harm.,
260
whether the plaintiffs unreasonable reliance severed the causal chain. See,
e.g., Ralston Dry-Wall Co. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 926 F.2d 99 (1st Cir. 1991)
(citing to intervening cause cases, holding that plaintiff's unjustifiable reliance
rendered defendant's negligent misrepresentation "not the proximate cause" of
plaintiff's loss under Rhode Island law). Courts sometimes hold that a plain-
tiff's unforeseeable misuse of a product constitutes a superseding cause also, a
holding which may be characterized as a proxy for the idea that a manufacturer
owes no duty to protect a plaintiff from unforeseeable uses of its products. See
generally William J. McNichols, The Relevance of the Plaintiff's Misconduct
in Strict Tort Products Liability, the Advent of Comparative Responsibility,
and the Proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts, 47 OKLA. L. REv. 201 (1994);
Mark E. Roszkowski & Robert A. Prentice, Reconciling Comparative Negli-
gence and Strict Liability: A Public Policy Analysis, 33 ST. Louis U. L.J. 19,
68-81 (1988).
256. 568 So. 2d 1146 (La. Ct. App. 1990).
257. Id. at 1150.
258. Id. at 1151.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 1150.
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Similarly, a Washington court affirmed a jury verdict for the de-
fendant landowner where the plaintiff, a social guest, had tripped
over a bedspread after she had made up the bed.26' The jury had
been instructed on open and obvious hazards as well as on super-
seding cause, and found in a special verdict that the defendants were
negligent but that their negligence was "not the proximate cause" of
plaintiffs injury. 2  Affirming, the appeals court said that there was
sufficient evidence to support a finding that the plaintiffs "own fail-
ure to exercise reasonable care to avoid'a danger known to her was
an independent, as contrasted with a concurring, cause of her injury
which broke the chain of causation set in motion by defendant's
negligence. 263 As an alternative ground, the court noted that the de-
fendants did not owe plaintiff a duty because she "had equal reason
to know of the condition" of the bedspread.264
To take another example, in an FTCA case from Florida, the
plaintiff was a public invitee in a national forest who tripped over a
parking barrier next to her campsite and sued the government for her
injuries. 265 Evidence at trial indicated that the plaintiff was aware of
the barrier and that lanterns illuminated the area at the time of the ac-
cident.266 On these facts, the court granted judgment for defendant,
saying "there is no duty to warn an invitee of visible or obvious haz-
ards," and explicitly finding that plaintiffs "negligence was the sole
proximate cause of her injury" as a matter of law.267 Since plaintiffs
"negligence was the sole proximate cause of her injury," the court
concluded, "she is barred from recovering damages.
268
In summary, anyone who reads more than a handful of cases
that use the terms "sole proximate cause" or "superseding cause"
against plaintiffs can see that at times, other existing doctrines could
have been invoked to reach the same result. This is not particularly
problematic, since the same criticism undoubtedly could be mounted
261. See Daly v. Lynch, 600 P.2d 592 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979).
262. Id. at 594.
263. Id. at 597.
264. Id.
265. See Trowell v. United States, 526 F. Supp. 1009 (M.D. Fla. 1981) (ap-
plying Florida law).
266. See id. at 1012.
267. Id. at 1013.
268. Id.
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at a score of tort doctrines. Redundancy has rarely been thought a
sufficient reason to abandon a long-standing doctrine; 269 it has long
been recognized that tort doctrines tend to travel in packs.270 And, as
G. Edward White so well put it, "for all the impressive scholarly en-
ergies directed at the unification, simplification, and ordering of tort
law, the field seems to have an inherent capacity to lapse into disor-
derliness, inconsistencies and complexities. ' '2 71 There is thus nothing
particularly unusual or troubling about the proxy function generally
served by the doctrines of superseding or sole proximate cause.
C. Judge and Jury Functions
The doctrines of superseding or sole proximate cause against
plaintiffs also function at times as devices to shift the decisional re-
sponsibility between judge and jury. At times, the superseding or
sole proximate cause doctrine is used to take a case away from a
jury, in essence to direct a verdict for a defendant rather than allow-
ing a jury to give an extraordinarily faulty plaintiff even a reduced
recovery. Courts have not hesitated to take cases away from juries
where a plaintiffs conduct is so "extraordinary" as to be unforesee-
able as a matter of law.272 A good example is found in Mack v.
269. See GREEN, supra note 252, at 26 ("Probably the most extravagant net-
work of theories employed in tort cases is found in the negligence group....
There are very few negligence cases, if any, which cannot be stated in at least
several... theories. One lawyer or one judge will insist that a problem to be
decided is a question of legal duty, another a question of assumed risk, still an-
other a question of contributory negligence, while the appellate court may say
it is one of proximate cause.").
270. Green, after quoting two authors who asserted that legal principles are
in the habit of traveling or hunting in pairs, asserted quite correctly that "it is
more accurate to say that these principles and rules travel and hunt in 'packs'
instead of 'pairs' and that it is seldom that there are as few as a 'pair' in a
'pack."' Id. at 27 n.2 (quoting John Dickinson, The Law Behind Law: I1, 25
COLUM. L. REv. 285, 298 (1929), and W.W. Cook, 38 YALE L.J. 405, 406
(1929)).
271. G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL
HIsTORY 243 (1980).
272. See, e.g., Kuras v. International Harvester Co., 820 F.2d 15 (1st Cir.
1987) (applying Rhode Island law, directed verdict for defendant affirmed
where plaintiffs act in placing his hand into spinning lawnmower blade con-
stituted an intervening act, precluding recovery against the manufacturer); Fal-
cone v. City of New York, 566 N.Y.S.2d 352 (App. Div. 1991) (motion to
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Altmans Stage Lighting Co. 2 73  The plaintiff, a repairman, was
working on the roof of defendant's building when the wind blew
down his ladder. Defendant was under a statutory duty to furnish safe
ladders and other devices for repair and maintenance jobs. The court
noted that it was customary for workers to secure their own ladders
to buildings, but plaintiff did not do so on this occasion. Despite
being in "no immediate danger," plaintiff "found an old, worn rope
in a hatchway and decided to use the rope to lower himself from the
roof. The rope broke and he plunged to the ground," suffering seri-
ous injuries when he hit the sidewalk twenty-eight feet below.274 On
these facts, the trial court dismissed plaintiffs claim, and the appel-
late division affirmed. The court went through a lengthy discussion
of intervening cause, concluding that plaintiffs conduct was "un-
foreseeable and independent of defendant's breach of duty," and
adding, "[t]he failure of the defendant to properly anchor the ladder
had nothing to do with plaintiff's attempt to reach the street via the
rope., 275 Had plaintiff simply waited on the roof, or asked someone
to summon help, he would not have been injured, said the court.276
The Mack case well represents the use of superseding cause to con-
trol jury discretion, which might be exercised to make the slightly
negligent defendant (or a very negligent defendant whose conduct
plays a very small causal role in the harm) pay a small percentage of
a large amount of damages. While the amount of damages was never
discussed in the case, the severity of plaintiffs injuries would mean
that if the jury were allowed to find that the defendant was only five
percent or ten percent responsible, the plaintiff still would have
received a substantial judgment. Controlling jury discretion which
might be exercised to make a negligent defendant pay all of plain-
tiff s damages was, of course, one of the central functions of
dismiss granted in case where decedent used chemicals to clean up water dam-
age to floor allegedly caused by city's negligence in causing flood); Zieker v..
Orchard Park, 538 N.Y.S.2d 671 (App. Div. 1989) (plaintiffs dive into shal-
low water was sole proximate cause as a matter of law); Griffith v. City of
New York, 507 N.Y.S.2d 445 (App. Div. 1986) (dismissal proper where dece-
dent allegedly negligently denied medical help at public school, went home
and fell out of an open apartment window).
273. 470 N.Y.S.2d 664 (App. Div. 1984).
274. Id. at 666.
275. Id. at 668.
276. See id.
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contributory negligence as a complete bar;2 77 the ameliorative simi-
larity is striking,278 although today's amelioration is arguably to a
milder effect since it prevents a jury only from making a slightly
negligent defendant pay some of plaintiff's damages.
To take another good example, in Lionarons v. General Electric
Co.,279 a New York court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary
judgment for defendant landowner in a case brought by a man who
dove into shallow water. The court found it "significant" that plain-
tiff was an experienced swimmer "who was well aware of the haz-
ards inherent in diving in natural settings," and who "admitted ob-
serving from the diving board gradations in water color.., which
differentiated the deep water areas from the shallow areas. 280 On
these facts, the court said, the trial court was justified in holding that
the plaintiffs dive "was a superseding act of negligence absolving
defendants of any negligent conduct." 28' Thus, the defendant owed
nothing in a pure comparative regime and did not even have a jury
case, even though the court explicitly noted that the defendants were
negligent in permitting trespassers to use their property and in main-
taining a trash can on their property.282
More commonly, however, courts invoke the doctrines of super-
seding and sole proximate cause not to take a case away from the
jury, but to justify giving it to the jury. The framing of an issue as
one involving proximate cause generally or intervening cause spe-
cifically thrusts the judgmental responsibility onto the jury (ostensi-
bly to resolve numerous fact questions) and frees the court from
making a difficult decision, perhaps on duty grounds.283 This has
277. See, e.g., Wex S. Malone, The Formative Era of Contributory Negli-
gence, 41 ILL. L. REv. 163-77 (1946) (an excellent, succinct historical analysis
of the use of contributory negligence to control jury discretion).
278. "Courts wanted to control juries during the last century, they want to
control them today, and they will probably want to continue to control them in
the future. If we take away contributory negligence from the judges, they will
find some other way. It's hard to beat judicial ingenuity." Id. at 182.
279. 626 N.Y.S.2d 321 (1995).
280. Id. at322.
281. Id.
282. See id.
283. "The true rule is, that what is the proximate cause of an injury is ordi-
narily a question for the jury. It is not a question of science or of legal knowl-
edge. It is to be determined as a fact, in view of the circumstances of fact at-
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long been common in this country, and should surprise no student of
the American courts.254 Indeed, it is the institution of the jury that
truly makes possible the kinds of often subtle judicial modifications
of pure comparative responsibility discussed above. By ultimately
turning over to the jury the issue of whether plaintiffs conduct was
so significant, or so faulty, or so bizarre, as to warrant the complete
denial of relief, courts empower juries to arrive at rough, but hope-
fully just, determinations in cases where applying the "unamelio-
rated" letter of the law of pure comparative fault would work an in-
justice on a slightly negligent defendant.2 5 Seen in this light, one
major salutary function of superseding cause and sole proximate
cause is to provide the jury a doctrinally acceptable way to avoid
giving any damages to an overwhelmingly negligent plaintiff even
after the adoption of pure comparative responsibility. Florida's for-
mulation is illustrative. Florida courts hold that summary judgment
is properly granted to a defendant in a negligence case if defendant
can prove that "there was no negligence, or that the plaintiffs negli-
gence was the sole proximate cause of the injury., 28 6 They also hold,
however, that this burden is "onerous," especially after the 1973
tending it." Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Kellogg, 94 U.S. 469, 474
(1876).
284. "There undoubtedly has been a very definite tendency of the courts,
which has even received judicial recognition, to avoid consideration and analy-
sis of the more difficult problems, and to abdicate decision by leaving the en-
tire set of troublesome issues to the twelve men in the box." Prosser, Proxi-
mate Cause, supra note 186, at 420 (citing Williams v. San Francisco &
Northwestern R.R., 6 Cal. App. 715, 724, 93 P. 122 (Ct. App. 1907) (noting a
"disposition of the courts to leave all doubtful cases to the jury")). For a suc-
cinct history of the evolution of proximate cause from a legal question to a
question of fact to be decided by the jury, see HoRWITz, supra note 30, at 54-
63.
285. See, e.g., Weller v. Colleges of the Senecas, 635 N.Y.S.2d 990 (App.
Div. 1995) (genuine fact issues as to whether plaintiff's act in riding bicycle on
a path after dark was the sole proximate cause of his injuries in suit against the
landowner for negligently maintaining the path); Shutak v. Handler, 599
N.Y.S.2d 24 (App. Div. 1993) (genuine fact issues as to whether tenant's act in
getting up on chair in an attempt to repair her ceiling was a superseding cause
of her harm in suit against her landlord for failing to repair the ceiling himself);
Walter v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 598 N.Y.S.2d 416 (App. Div. 1993)
(genuine fact issues as to whether plaintiff's act in diving from bridge into
shallow river was sole proximate cause of his injuries in suit against power
company that controlled water level of river through a series of dams).
286. Wills v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 351 So. 2d 29, 31 (Fla. 1977).
940
BUTTERFIELD RIDES AGAIN
adoption of comparative negligence and the 1977 abolition of as-
sumption of risk as an absolute defense, and that the movant must
show lack of negligence or plaintiffs sole proximate cause "une-
quivocally. ' 287 Obviously, this is indeed an onerous burden, which
is rarely met by defendants in Florida courts.288 This simply means
that juries, not judges, make the ultimate determination of whether a
plaintiff's negligence is so overwhelming as to be the sole proximate
cause of the harn
One problem with presenting a jury with the issue of whether a
plaintiffs negligence is a superseding cause, or the sole proximate
cause, of his harm is that such terminology tends to be confusing,
even befuddling. Indeed, that the doctrines of superseding and sole
proximate cause often confuse bench, bar, and jury can hardly be de-
nied. One source of confusion perhaps has to do with the words
themselves. As a number of courts have noted, intervening and su-
perseding cause are terms that appear on their face to apply only to
third parties or to forces other than a plaintiff or a single defen-
dant.289 The Restatement explicitly defines a superseding cause as
(Can act of a third person or other force" that cuts off a defendant's li-
ability,290 a definition that seems tortured if interpreted to include the
287. ld. at30-31.
288. See, for example, cases all ruling against defense summary judgments
where defendant had argued plaintiffs sole proximate cause: Hervey v. Al-
fonso, 650 So. 2d 644 (Fla. Dist. Ct App. 1995) (plaintiff slipped on defen-
dant's wet floor); Nicosia v. Otis Elevator Co., 548 So. 2d 854 (Fla. Dist. Ct
App. 1989) (plaintiff injured escaping from stalled elevator); Chelton v. Talla-
hassee-Leon County Civic Ctr. Auth., 525 So. 2d 972 (Fla. Dist Ct App.
1988) (plaintiff fell down stairs in defendant's building); Bradford v. Bern-
stein, 510 So. 2d 1204 (Fla. Dist Ct App. 1987) (same); Cutler v. St. John's
United Methodist Church, 489 So. 2d 123 (Fla. Dist. Ct App. 1986) (17-year-
old girl drowned on swimming trip organized and supervised by defendant);
Stahl v. Metropolitan Dade County, 438 So. 2d 14 (Fla. Dist Ct App. 1983)
(decedent struck by car in street after leaving bike path maintained by defen-
dant); Nurdin v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 392 So. 2d 928 (Fla. Dist Ct App.
1980) (plaintiff tripped over hose left lying on walk on defendant's property);
St Martin v. Allstate Ins. Co., 367 So. 2d 1077 (Fla. Dist Ct App. 1979) (pe-
destrian struck by car driven by defendant); U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Progressive
Cas. Ins. Co., 362 So. 2d 414 (Fla. Dist. Ct App. 1978) (plaintiffs car struck
by defendant's car).
289. See, e.g., Chambers v. Bunker, 598 S.W.2d 204, 207 (Mo. Ct. App.
1980).
290. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 34, § 440.
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plaintiff's own conduct, although a large number of courts indulge in
that torture. Sole proximate cause is not a model of clarity, either.
First, the word "sole" is surplusage, since the term is invoked simply
to express the idea that one party, not any other, is a proximate cause
of harm; to label the plaintiffs negligence as "the sole proximate
cause of harm" is the same as saying that the plaintiff has failed to
prove that the defendant is a proximate cause of harm. Second, one
cannot be certain of the term's precise meaning in any given juris-
diction without knowing what matters fit under the umbrella term
"proximate cause." Some states use the term "proximate cause" to
mean something other than actual cause or cause in fact; other states
use the term 'proximate cause" to include cause in fact.29' In those
latter states, "sole proximate cause" could literally mean a failure of
actual causation. Finally, even within a single jurisdiction, one
sometimes finds the term "sole proximate cause" transmogrified into
"sole and proximate cause. ' ,29 This usage connotes, and perhaps de-
notes, that the word "sole" does not modify "proximate cause" at all,
but only the word "cause," again implying that the conduct at issue is
the sole actual cause of harm. At best, this variation does little to cut
through the fog that would exist even in its absence.
Proximate cause itself has been called "a tangle and a jungle, a
palace of mirrors and a maze. 2 93 Several early, brilliant torts schol-
ars unequivocally concluded that it was impossible to develop an
overarching theory of proximate cause, 94 and it is not at all clear that
291. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Gonzales, 54 Cal. 3d 1041, 1049, 819 P.2d 872,
876, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 913, 917 (1991) ("One of the concepts included in the
term proximate cause is cause in fact, also referred to as actual cause."); Stahl,
438 So. 2d at 17 ("It seems clear at the outset that the 'proximate cause' ele-
ment of a negligence action embraces, at the very least, a causation-in-fact test
292. See, e.g., Gavagan v. United States, 955 F.2d 1016, 1018 (5th Cir.
1992) (affirming district court's finding that "'plaintiff's actions were the sole
and proximate cause of his own injuries') (emphasis omitted); Chesapeake &
Ohio Ry. v. Newman, 243 F.2d 804, 808 (6th Cir. 1957) (plaintiff whose neg-
ligence was the "sole and proximate cause" of his own injury cannot recover).
293. Prosser, Proximate Cause, supra note 186, at 369 (also cautioning that
"[e]verything worth saying on the subject has been said many times, as well as
a great deal more that was not worth saying," a caution that has been honored
more in the breach).
294. See, e.g., POLLOCK, supra note 31, at 39 (beginning to discuss the "rule
of 'natural and probable consequences,"' noting that "we must remember that
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295matters have gotten any easier. In part perhaps because of the in-
ability of scholars and courts to work out and apply generalized prin-
ciples consistently, "[tihere is a decided tendency to leave every
question [of proximate cause] to the bewildered jury, under some
vague instruction which provides no effective guide., 296 The doc-
trines do have the potential to vex juries. As the Minnesota Supreme
Court said, "the question of what is an intervening cause which will
supersede the original negligence of the wrongdoer always presents
difficulties. The difficulty arises not so much with the rules of law in
themselves as to the application of them to a given set of facts.
2 9 7
And a New Mexico judge concluded that "scholarly judges are able
to define 'proximate cause,' but none can explain it. They can pierce
the meaning of each of the various causes that defy the minds of the
average juror.... Ignorance of the meaning of the law is ignorance
in action.,
298
At bottom, the use of these proximate cause doctrines to shift re-
sponsibility either to, or-more commonly-away from judges must
be done with some circumspection, and juries should not be handed
overly puzzling legal formulations without good reason. But as long
as proximate cause is regarded as a jury question, it is difficult to ar-
gue that juries are somehow not entitled, in proper cases, to receive
more specific doctrinal guidance toward their decision via instruc-
tions on superseding cause or sole proximate cause.
it is not a logical definition, but only a guide to the exercise of common
sense"); Henry W. Edgerton, Legal Cause, 72 U. PA. L. REv. 211 (1924) ("[I]t
neither is nor should be possible to extract from the cases rules which cover the
subject and are definite enough to solve cases."); Jeremiah Smith, Legal Cause
in Actions of Tort, 25 HARV. L. REv. 303, 317 (1912) (concluding that all at-
tempts at making the law of causation certain have "resulted in propounding
rules which are demonstrably erroneous"). See generally Leon Green, The
Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, 28 COLUM. L. REv. 1014 (1928) (decrying
an attempt to restate tort law as "a most hopeless task").
295. See, e.g., SPEISER ET AL., supra note 18, § 11:22, at 457 (speaking of
proximate cause, asserting that "an almost innumerable series of particular
events, concerning virtually every conceivable sort of negligence situation, has
been involved in these cases-with the usual contrary results, the usual ad hoc
determinations, and the seeming irreconcilability of specific cases").
296. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 9, § 45, at 319.
297. Sowada v. Motzko, 98 N.W.2d 182, 187 (Minn. 1959).
298. Armstrong v. Industrial Elec. & Equip. Serv., 639 P.2d 81, 86-87 (N.M.
Ct. App. 1981) (Sutin, J., concurring).
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V. CONCLUSION
Some of the criticisms of the use of superseding or sole proxi-
mate cause to bar negligent plaintiffs are accurate, but not particu-
larly forceful. Often, these doctrines are unclear and redundant in
application. Courts should not intentionally be unclear in their
usages; certainly, for example, the doctrine of superseding cause
should arise as an issue in a case only when it may fairly be said that
the plaintiffs subsequent negligent act was not reasonably foresee-
able to the defendant. That a doctrine is unclear and redundant,
however, hardly stands as a reason for its elimination; if it did, most
tort doctrines would stand equally condemned. Tort doctrines "are
flexible and open-ended and the contours of those doctrines often are
filled in by juries rather than by legal elites. 299 Such rules can never
be pristine in their clarity. As Leon Green put it, "[t]he most a legal
science can do with the classes of cases here involved is to employ
broad formulas both for judge and jury and rely upon their respective
judgment-passing capacity to dispose of the cases satisfactorily as
they arise., 300 The open quality of tort doctrines serves as a check on
the power of legal elites, including, most notably, academics, who
generally urge clarification and simplification.30 '
We must also be content to live with a host of superfluous rules
in tort law. Indeed, redundancy in tort law is probably more good
than bad. It has long been the law that "[e]ach party to a lawsuit has
a right to have the court give instructions stating the law applicable
to the evidence presented by such party, so that if the jury find the
facts in accordance with such evidence they may correctly apply
the law thereto. 30 2 The almost infinite variety of fact patterns in
tort law and the creativity of tort lawyers produce a sufficiently great
number of legal theories and a corresponding need for a great
299. Paul T. Hayden, Religiously Motivated "Outrageous" Conduct: Inten-
tional Infliction of Emotional Distress As a Weapon Against "Other People's
Faiths," 34 WM. & MARY L. REv. 579, 580 (1993).
300. GREEN, supra note 252, at 57-58.
301. See WHrrE, supra note 271, at 243 ("The capacity of law in America to
resist serving as an orderly system of social control is at least as strong as the
impulse of legal theorists to make it so serve.").
302. Sampsell v. Rybczynski, 82 N.E. 244,246 (Ill. 1907).
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number of overlapping and largely redundant sub-doctrines on which
to hang those theories.
Last but not least, the complaint that it undercuts pure compara-
tive responsibility to bar an overwhelmingly negligent plaintiffs re-
covery on the ground that such conduct is a superseding or sole
proximate cause largely misses the point that such use of these doc-
trines serves to soften the potentially harsh consequences of pure
comparison on particular defendants in particular cases. Such a
function is not at all inconsistent with preservation of pure compara-
tive systems, as opposed to the theory behind such systems, and rep-
resents a doctrinal safety valve that is necessary for pure comparison
to remain acceptable and thus viable.3 °3
Of course, the critics are right that these doctrines, if not used
cautiously, can undercut pure comparative responsibility systems and
do more harm than good. Courts should strive to invoke them only
in situations where a plaintiffs fault, or causal contribution, is truly
extraordinary, overwhelming, or gross compared to that of the de-
fendant. Where the facts do not support such a conclusion, courts
should not utilize these doctrines and should not instruct juries on
them. By and large, the case law does not demonstrate such wide-
spread misuse.
In closing, it is hard to see how pure comparative responsibility
can survive without some subsidiary doctrines that serve as a safety
valve in hard cases. Superseding and sole proximate cause serve
such a function today and courts that have found them useful tools to
achieve a measure of flexibility are not likely to surrender them
303. One might ask whether contributory negligence would have survived as
long as it did without ameliorating doctrines such as last clear chance. See
PRoSsER & KEETON, supra note 9, § 66, at 464 (suggesting that the effect of
last clear chance was not to move contributory negligence toward a compara-
tive system, but rather to "freeze" that transition). Those who would like to
see pure systems modified directly then, might well be right to call for the
abolition of the doctrines of superseding and sole proximate cause to bar
plaintiffs' claims. Cf Robertson, Causation Confusion, supra note 174, at 29
& n.121 (suggesting in passing that states might adopt a system under which a
plaintiff is barred if 80% or more at fault, noting that there is "nothing magic"
about the 50 or 51% level that almost all modified comparative states have
adopted).
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lightly.30 4 Yes, Butterfield rides again. But seen properly, it is not
the Butterfield that barred the slightly negligent plaintiff from all re-
covery. It is the Butterfield that barred the plaintiff who foolishly
rode his horse at full gallop into the pole that could be seen at one
hundred yards, with room to ride around. It is Bayley's Butterfield,
where it could fairly be said that given the plaintiffs degree of fault
and causal contribution, "the accident appeared to happen entirely
from his own fault.,
30 5
304. See GREEN, supra note 252, at 223 (stating that the phraseology of cau-
sation "has served but one useful function, and that has been to give the judges
a dependable way out of difficult situations when they have made up theirminds but either do not know how, or else do not take the time, to articulate
their conclusions on a rational basis ... it has served this function well");
Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Cats or Gardens: Which Metaphor Explains Neg-
lience? Or, Is Simplicity Simpler than Flexibility?, 58 LA. L. REv. 35, 66
(1997) (noting that criticisms of the use of sole proximate cause against plain-
tiffs have met with only, limited success because "courts continue to flexibly
approach negligence problems").
305. Butterfield v. Forrester, 103 Eng. Rep. 926, 927 (K.B. 1809).
